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 BLOOD RELATIONS:  COLLECTIVE MEMORY, CULTURAL TRAUMA, & THE 
PROSECUTION AND EXECUTION OF TIMOTHY MCVEIGH 
 
Jody Lyneé Madeira† 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, processes of reconstruction—remembering victims, caring 
for family members and survivors, and punishing the perpetrators—began even as debris from the Murrah Federal 
Building was being cleared.  Based on conclusions obtained from intensive interviews with 27 victims’ family 
members and survivors, this article explores how memory of the bombing as a culturally traumatic event was 
constructed through participation in groups formed after the bombing and participation in the legal proceedings 
against perpetrators Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols.  These acts cultivated the formation of various 
relationships—between family members and survivors as well as between these victimized populations and the 
perpetrators—that both helped and hindered individual and communal reconstructions of meaning.  This article will 
first addresses the efficacy of a collective memory and cultural trauma perspective for analyzing two collective 
processes of sense-making—group membership and legal proceedings—in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City 
bombing.  It will then briefly describe the mental context in which family members and survivors joined groups in 
the wake of the bombing, and the functions those groups played in trauma recovery, after which it will summarize 
the impact of group membership on punishment expectations.  Next, it will discuss the involuntary relationship that 
formed between McVeigh and family members and survivors predicated on the social and media representations of 
McVeigh; due to this relationship, McVeigh was felt to be a constant presence in victims’ lives until his 2001 
execution.  Finally, this article will examine family members’ and survivors’ perceptions of communicative 
interchange with McVeigh in the venues of the trial and execution.  The implications of this case study illustrate in 
what ways concepts such as victimhood and justice are continually being expanded, with the implication that law is 
not only a social institution that mediates cultural trauma and cultivates collective memory, but also is manifestly 
conscious of these roles. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On April 19, 1995, thousands of pounds of fuel oil and fertilizer brought down the nine-
story Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building.  A total of 842 persons were injured or killed as a direct 
result of this tragedy; 168 of the 842 were killed, 19 of whom were children.1  The blast left 462 
homeless and damaged 312 buildings and businesses.2  In the weeks and months following the 
bombing, several groups emerged and became extraordinarily active, serving as magnets for 
community membership and resources; formative among them were the Oklahoma City National 
Memorial Task Force, charged with overseeing the building of the Oklahoma City National 
Memorial, and a group comprised of family members and survivors seeking to shorten the 
lengthy habeas appeals process so as to bring peace to victims’ families.  In subsequent trials, 
Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were indicted and charged with 8 counts of first-degree 
murder for the deaths of federal officials as well as several other federal charges, including 
conspiracy.  While McVeigh was convicted in June 1997 on all counts and sentenced to death, 
the jury in Nichols’ trial found him guilty of involuntary manslaughter and conspiracy after 
deliberating for 41 hours, failing to reach a unanimous verdict on whether Nichols planned the 
bombing “with the intent to kill.” After being sentenced to life in prison without possibility of 
parole, Nichols was tried and convicted in 2004 of 162 counts for first-degree murder in 
Oklahoma state court, but again escaped the death penalty.   
The legal aftermath of the Oklahoma City Bombing culminated in the execution of 
Timothy McVeigh. On June 12, 2001, 232 witnesses—10 in the death house at the state 
penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana and 222 at a remote viewing location in Oklahoma City—
prepared for an event that all hoped would bring some ending to an unspeakable period in their 
lives.  Whereas “live” witnesses viewed a side profile of McVeigh, “remote” witnesses observed 
the closed circuit feed from a camera positioned on the ceiling directly over McVeigh’s face.  
Although the remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft emphasized “closure,” most witnesses 
found some element of the execution disappointing.  Sue Ashford, a survivor who witnessed the 
execution via closed-circuit transmission, stated “the man just went to sleep.”3  Paul Howell, 
another witness, lamented, “We didn’t get anything from his face.  His facial expressions were 
                                                 
1
 Karen A. Sitterle & Robin H. Gurwitch, The Terrorist Bombing in Oklahoma City, in WHEN A COMMUNITY 
WEEPS:  CASE STUDIES IN GROUP SURVIVORSHIP 163 (Ellen S. Zimmer & Mary Beth Williams eds., 1999). 
2
 Id. at 163-64.  
3
 Lois Romano, McVeigh is Executed:  Bomber is 1st Federal Prisoner Put to Death Since 1963, WASHINGTON POST 
Tuesday June 12, 2001 at A01. 
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just about as calm as they could be.”4  Larry Whicher said that “it doesn’t provide as much as I 
thought it would.”5 
Dramatic and tragic deaths are cultural traumas that require explanation.  In their wake, 
understandings are formed collectively through such processes as interpersonal discussion and 
media coverage.  “Interest” groups form in the aftermath of traumatic events to facilitate 
collective information-gathering and mourning.  In the context of the Oklahoma City bombing, 
memory of the bombing as a culturally traumatic event was constructed through social processes, 
and ties formed out of bloodshed that both helped and hindered family members’ and survivors 
reconstructions of meaning.  Rapport formed between members of prominent task-oriented 
community groups formed in the days and weeks after the bombing was a key source of 
mnemetic energy, and these bonds were often felt to be as strong as those of blood kinship.  In 
addition, an involuntary association between victims’ families and survivors and perpetrators 
Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols crystallized at 9:02 a.m. on April 19, 1995.  If voluntary 
relationships between members of community groups were strengthening and constructive ties, 
then this involuntary victim-offender relationship was a destructive and confining tie that trussed 
victims to the bombing as an event.   
To study these relationships, their construction and representative effects, is to step into a 
realm where Ockham’s Razor fails.  This article considers how family members and survivors 
made sense of the bombing through both group membership and participation in legal 
proceedings.  Engaging in collective memory work, their responses to the bombing were shaped 
by two primary relationships—the positive, healing, unmediated relationships formed between 
group members and the negative, destructive, mediated relationships between family 
members/survivors and Timothy McVeigh.  Specifically, it poses three research questions.  First, 
in the wake of collective cultural trauma, what impact, if any, does advocacy group membership 
have upon memory?  Second, when pursuing accountability for criminal perpetrators of 
collective trauma, how do victims’ family members and survivors negotiate institutional 
constraints to form perceptions of these perpetrators and conclusions about the “meaning” of the 
traumatic event?  Finally, how do victims’ family members and survivors react to the execution 
of a criminal perpetrator, and what factors are “meaningful” in the reactions they have?   
In endeavoring to answer these important questions, I conducted in-depth, face-to-face 
open-ended interviews with 27 individuals who were either victims’ family members or 
survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing.  Throughout this article, I refer to these interviewees 
as research “participants.”  This interviewing technique allowed me to conversationally guide 
participants through accounts of how the bombing, trials, and McVeigh’s execution impacted 
their lives while granting participants complete freedom of response and allowing me the 
flexibility to ask follow-up questions.  Interviews were conducted at any site in Oklahoma City 
that was comfortable for the participant, and most were conducted in participants’ residences.  
Three interviews with participants who did not reside in Oklahoma were conducted 
electronically via land-line telephone.  All interviews were recorded with participants’ 
permission and transcribed for analysis.  A total of 29 participants were interviewed; however, 
two were not included because they were rescue workers, and not victims’ family members or 
survivors present at the moment of the bombing.  More specific information on individual 
participants’ characteristics is included in the Appendix.  Research participants were recruited 
                                                 
4
 Id.  
5
 Id.  
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through two methods.  First, letters were mailed anonymously6 to individuals on the mailing list 
of the Murrah Federal Building Survivors Association; these letters described the research 
project and requested that interested individual contact me directly to participate.  Second, other 
prospective research participants were contacted by individuals who had already been 
interviewed; these participants in turn contacted me directly to schedule interviews.  The final 
participant sample was composed of 17 females and 10 males.  Of the 27 participants, 26 were 
Caucasian and one was African-American.  This demographic composition parallels both the 
overwhelmingly white membership of the post bombing groups, including the Murrah Building 
Survivor’s Association, and that of the larger victim population.  All participants were over 18 
years of age (participants’ ages ranged from mid-30s to low-70s) and thus were able to legally 
consent to participation.  Because this project was exploratory and no a priori theory existed to 
guide my inquiry, I adopted a grounded theory methodology from its inception.   
This article will first explore the efficacy of a collective memory and cultural trauma 
perspective for analyzing collective processes of sense-making through group membership and 
legal proceedings.  It will then briefly describe the mental context in which family members and 
survivors joined groups in the wake of the bombing, and the functions those groups played in 
trauma recovery, after which it will summarize the impact of group membership on punishment 
expectations.  Thereafter, this article will detail an involuntary relationship which formed 
between McVeigh and family members and survivors and which was predicated on the basis of 
constructed social and media representations.  Finally, this article will examine family members’ 
and survivors’ perceptions of communicative interchange with McVeigh in the venues of the 
trial and execution.  Throughout, victims’ family members and survivors are referred to by 
number instead of name to preserve their anonymity. 
 
II.  COLLECTIVE MEMORY, CULTURAL TRAUMA, AND THE LAW 
 
“With memory set smarting like a reopened wound, a man’s past is not simply 
a dead history, an outworn preparation of the present:  it is not a repented error 
shaken loose from the life:  it is a still quivering part of himself, bringing 
shudders and bitter flavours and the tinglings of a merited shame.”   
GEORGE ELIOT, MIDDLEMARCH7 
      
As George Eliot astutely observed, memory is a living concept, one that is not merely 
alive and evolving but social, capable of triggering emotions such as shame that only have 
meaning within a collective.  Thus, in the aftermath of culturally traumatic events, there is a need 
to study the creation of meaning from a collective memory perspective that focuses upon the 
collision between victims’ demands and law’s institutional needs for rule adherence and 
legitimacy.  Communication scholars recognize that “memory is not simply a mental operation 
that a person uses or that she or he can refine and improve” but is instead a “phenomenon of 
community.”8  Memory has been “a major preoccupation for social thinkers since the Greeks.”9  
                                                 
6
 Contact letters and postage were provided to an officer of the Murrah Federal Building Survivor’s Association, 
who then addressed and mailed the letters to association members.   
7
 Book 6, ch. 61 (1871). 
8
 Carole Blair, Communication as Collective Memory, in COMMUNICATION AS…:  PERSPECTIVES ON THEORY 52, 
(Gregory J. Shepherd, Jeffrey St. John & Ted Striphas eds., 2006) 
9
 Jeffrey K. Olick & Joyce Robbins, Social Memory Studies:  From “Collective Memory” to the Historical Study of 
Mnemonic Practices, ANN. REV. OF SOC.  No. 24 at 106 (1998). 
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Yet, a social perspective on memory only took root in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, with the work of Henri Bergson, Sigmund Freud, Walter Benjamin, and Frederic 
Bartlett.10  Contemporary usage of the term is traced to Maurice Halbwachs, and the 1950 
publication of his essay on collective memory, Les mémoires collectives.11  Halbwachs posited 
that collectives enable memory, such that “no memory as possible outside frameworks used by 
people living in society to determine and retrieve their recollections.”12  Since 1980, there has 
been a “pursuit, rescue, and celebration of collective memory,” perhaps due to political 
developments such as multiculturalism, the decline and fall of Communism, and movements of 
victimization and victim’s rights;13 this focus upon collective memory has been “less in texts 
than in the spoken word, images, gestures, rituals and festivals.”14  
Memory work, then, is the process of working through and narrating experiences.  As 
such, it is always interpretive and constructive, and concerned with reaching closure about past 
events.  Through memory work, individuals gain distance from a life event that is necessary to 
understand and contextualize them and place them in causal relationships to other life 
occurrences—in other words, to position themselves in relation to that event.  Memory work is 
collective in the sense that individuals share many life events, and collaborative interpretations of 
these events may take shape as individuals gather and share memories and interpretations, with 
the result that individual perceptions are in turn reshaped by these communal exchanges.  Groups 
may therefore perform memory work by constructing areas of common knowledge which create 
social bonds between members.   
A collective memory perspective is the most appropriate lens through which to scrutinize 
the roles that behaviors such as group joining and attendance and participation in legal 
proceedings played in helping victims’ families and survivors to recover from the Oklahoma 
City bombing.  In essence, memory offers a form and content for addressing the Oklahoma City 
bombing in that it both structures and explains the evolving understandings of the bombing and 
its perpetrators formed by individuals and groups.  This conclusion is also compelled by the 
nature of trauma, which acquires its horrific proportions from its ability to destroy not only an 
individual’s sense of normality but the normality of the collectives that constitute that 
individual’s social support network.  Trauma has profound consequences for communities as 
well as individuals, and memory work has been shown to be central to the recovery or “working 
through” of the collective, which may require processes of sense-making, accountability and 
restitution, often procured through collective institutional means such as trials and truth 
commissions.  Most importantly, traumas affect collectives long after their survivors have passed 
on; the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Holocaust death camps are just two examples 
of traumas which happened over sixty years ago but which remain problems with which 
American collective memory must grapple.  Surely, then, trauma as a phenomenon is not 
reducible merely to individual proportions since its effects resonate most pervasively and 
permanently in the culture of a collective.  “Collective” here denotes victims’ family members 
and survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing. 
                                                 
10
 Id. 
11
 Id. 
12
 MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY 43 (Lewis A. Coser trans., University of Chicago Heritage of 
Sociology Series 1992) (1941). 
13
 See Michael Kammen, Review of Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory, by I. Irwin-
Zarecka, HIST. THEORY No. 34(3) at 245-61 (1995); Barry Schwartz, Memory as a Cultural System:  Abraham 
Lincoln in World War II, AM. SOC. REV., 61(5) at 908-27 (1996) 
14
 JACQUES LE GOFF, HISTORY AND MEMORY 95 (1992). 
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The theoretical mirror I hold up to this data, however, is not simply framed by collective 
memory.  The type of event structured by collective memory is also significant; traumatic events 
such as the Oklahoma City bombing call into play a theoretical subcategory of collective 
memory known as cultural trauma.  In analyzing the creation and reconstruction of meaning in 
the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, I document the evolution of a specific culture of 
interpretation and rehabilitation formed against a larger national cultural backdrop that prompts 
American citizens to feel “compelled to honor those…who have been murdered for an unjust 
cause.”15  As Alexander and Smith state, “those collective forces that are not compulsory, the 
social forces to which we enthusiastically and voluntarily respond….We do not mourn mass 
murder unless we have already identified with the victims, and this only happens once in a while, 
when the symbols are aligned in the right way.”16  According to Alexander, a recent leader in 
developing a theory of cultural trauma under the rubric of “cultural sociology,” cultural trauma 
“occurs when members of the collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event 
that leaves indelible marks on their group consciousness, marking their memories forever in 
changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways.”17  Cultural trauma provides 
a means by which collectives can begin to address an event perceived as traumatic, to “not only 
cognitively identify the existence and source of human suffering but “take on board” some 
significant [moral] responsibility for it.”18  In this way, collectives formulate and demonstrate 
“solidary relationships in ways that, in principle, allow them to share the sufferings of others…. 
societies expand the circle of the we.”19  Notably, cultural trauma is, like collective memory, a 
collective process of construction; as Smelser notes, “a collective trauma, affecting a group with 
definable membership, will, of necessity, also be associated with that group’s collective 
identity.”20 And cultural trauma is also explicitly trauma of culture—what Sztompka terms the 
“axio-normative and symbolic belief systems of a society.”21  Finally, because trauma is socially 
mediated, collectivities sense trauma in much the same way as a spider senses a fly in the web, 
by disturbing vibrations that disrupt the “patterned meanings of the collectivity.”22  But these 
“patterned meanings” that are disturbed must be meanings that penetrate to and are bound into 
the core of collective identity, so that that core is imperiled when those meanings are stretched 
too taut or broken altogether.   
Of course, trauma claims-making—like other forms of “linguistic action”—is 
“powerfully mediated by the nature of the institutional arenas within which it occurs.”23  This 
includes the institutions of the law and of mass media, each of which shape trauma claims in 
particular ways, and impose particular institutional consequences.  The legal institution is 
                                                 
15
 Jeffrey Alexander, Introduction to JEFFREY ALEXANDER, THE MEANINGS OF SOCIAL LIFE:  A CULTURAL 
SOCIOLOGY 3 (2003). 
16
 Id. 
17
 Id. at 85. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Id. 
20
 Neil J. Smelser, Psychological Trauma and Cultural Trauma, in JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, RON EYERMAN, 
BERNHARD GIESEN, NEIL J. SMELSER, & PIOTR SZTOMPKA, CULTURAL TRAUMA AND  IDENTITY 43  (2004). 
21
 Piotr Sztompka, The Trauma of Social Change:  A Case of Postcommunist Societies, in  JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, 
RON EYERMAN, BERNHARD GIESEN, NEIL J. SMELSER, & PIOTR SZTOMPKA, CULTURAL TRAUMA AND  IDENTITY 161 
(2004).  Traumatic change that is cultural “may  reverberate in the area of affirmed values and norms, patterns and 
rules, expectations and roles, accepted ideas and beliefs, narrative forms and symbolic meanings, definitions of 
situations and frames of discourse.”  Id. 
22
 ALEXANDER, supra note 15, at 92. 
23
 Id. at 97. 
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particularly significant for victims’ family members, who must rely on its proceedings to hold an 
offender accountable—a key step in working through the trauma of the crime.  According to 
Alexander, when the “cultural classification” of an event as traumatic “enters the legal realm, it 
will be disciplined by the demand to issue a definitive judgment of legally binding 
responsibilities and to distribute punishments and material reparations.”   
The institutional effect of law, then, is to narrow trauma claims to specific stages of the 
mnemetic process, such as the attribution of responsibility.24  Similarly, the ways in which the 
mass media as an institution affects claims of trauma enable the mnemetic process to gain new 
narrative “opportunities” but at the cost of becoming subject to “distinctive kinds of 
restrictions.”25  As a form of mediation, mass communication may provide heretofore 
inaccessible outlets for the dramatization of trauma, and may provide a vehicle for one 
interpretation to gain an edge over other competing interpretations.26  Yet, processes of 
constructing trauma “become subject to the restrictions of news reporting, with their demand for 
concision, ethical neutrality, and perspectival balance,” and may be “exaggerated and distorted” 
due to the competition between news outlets.27   
Law an institution, then, mediates cultural trauma and is a forum for the formation of 
collective memory.  There is a contemporary perception that, in the words of Elias Canetti, the 
dead “are nourished by judgment,” and that criminal law is a “means of recompensing the slain 
through a deliberative act.”28  As do other institutions, law has a collective memory of its own, 
particularly as a site for the communication and construction of cultural authority.29  The rule of 
law itself is a product of collective memory; the boundaries between the legal and the extra-legal 
are maintained through the judicial tradition—“a tradition that pervades all its members to a high 
degree”—which cumulatively “represent the collective work of a line of jurists and eminent 
magistrates.”30  Oliver Wendell Holmes infamously noted that “the life of the law has not been 
logic:  it has been experience,” and stated that “the law embodies the story of nation’s 
development through many centuries,” so that “the degree to which it is able to work out desired 
results depend very much on its past.”31  Significantly, law is product of social and well as legal 
actors; jurists always remain members of the social collective even after they put on the robes of 
advocacy or office.32   
Trials, including criminal prosecutions, belong within the category or rituals designated 
by Turner as “social dramas;” criminal law is especially comparable to the formation of 
collective memory since its deterrence concerns are oriented in the future, where collective 
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 Id. at 98. 
25
 Id. at 100. 
26
 Id.  
27
 Id.  
28
 LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT:  MAKING LAW AND HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE 
HOLOCAUST 1 (2001). 
29
 Halbwachs, who connects this delimiting behavior to the role of the judiciary as a collective memory institution.  
Halbwachs first notes that the judiciary’s erection of “barriers between its members and those of the other groups to 
whom they render justice” serves the purpose of “resist[ing] external influences and the passions and prejudices of 
the plaintiffs.”  HALBWACHS, supra note 12, at 140. 
30
 Id. 
31
 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (1881). 
32
 As Halbwachs notes, “when a judge or attorney enters the court building, he does not feel himself excluded or 
separated from the groups in the midst of which he spends the rest of his day…. Their actual presence is in fact 
unnecessary to allow him to continue to think and to behave -- even when he is at a distance from them -- as a 
member of these groups.”  HALBWACHS, supra note 12, at 142. 
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memory locates greater social solidarity, but its retributive concerns are situated in the past, 
where collective memory finds its narrative content.33  Garland notes that the rituals of criminal 
justice—the court-room trial, the passing of sentence, the execution of punishments—are, in 
effect, the formalized embodiment of the conscience collective,” which is “protected by a strict 
code of penal law, which -- unlike most law in modern society -- does evoke deep-seated 
emotions and a sense of the sacred.”34  Thus, the act of imposing punishment becomes a process 
of working through an event which imperils a collective.35  “Justice” becomes the operative 
concept for social solidarity, involving a consensus both that certain acts committed are wrong 
and must be punished.   
Collective memory is furthered by the delivery of legal stories.  In the criminal trial, the 
prosecutor serves as a public spokesman who“tell[s] the stories through which such sentiments 
are elicited and such membership consolidated.”36  In these stories, the culpability of the 
perpetrator assumes primary importance, since it the illegal exercise of the offender’s free will 
that dictates the outcome of the story and bring about the victim’s death.37 After conviction, 
punishment “signals the greater or lesser presence of collective memory in a society”; 
disciplining those who commit the most socially unacceptable acts reinforces our awareness of 
what acts are proscribed.38  The ability to enunciate and fix stories in legal frames, then, becomes 
an important source of social power.   
But the efficacy of legal proceedings as a trigger for collective memory formation is 
constrained by two concepts:  law’s modesty, or its superficial unwillingness to play such a 
formative mnemonic role; and its practices, rules and traditions that narrow the breadth and 
depth of inquiry to binary categories such as guilty or not guilty.  Because of law’s storying 
potential, citizens may expect legal proceedings to take a formative role in adjudicating history, 
leading to judicial protest.  In socially potent trials such as that of Adolf Eichmann, courts have 
explicitly invoked judicial modesty in rejecting such a definitive role, pleading shortsightedness 
and the lack of cultural authority.  But while courts pay lip service to judicial modesty, they cater 
to processes of collective memory formation despite themselves.39   
But legal doctrine certainly limits its efficacy for collective resolution of cultural trauma.  
Criminal prosecutions are formulated to hear and adjudicate evidence on whether a given suspect 
committed a criminal act—an inquiry with a very limited scope which is unlikely to reach the 
social implications of that criminal behavior.  Legal conclusions are inherently professionalized, 
derived through the application of legal principles to decide disputes on the basis of evidence 
introduced and evaluated in accordance with legal doctrine, all orchestrated by procedural rules.  
Stretching a conviction into a social statement may actually distort collective memory; a 
conviction, though comprehensive enough for professional purposes, is but the product of a 
necessarily narrow professional inquiry into a unique set of facts and may not be elastic enough 
to stretch to fit into a collective memory frame.  And that assumes that specialized legal practices 
                                                 
33
 MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 18 (1999). 
 
34
 DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 67, 57 (1990) 
35
 Id. at 67.  Garland continues, “[i]n doing justice, and in prosecuting criminals, these procedures are also giving 
formal expression to the feelings of the community -- and by being expressed in this way those feelings are both 
strengthened and gratified.”  Id. 
36
 OSIEL, supra note 33, at 28. 
37
 Id. at 72. 
38
 Id. at 31. 
39
 “Even as the court seeks to delimit its professional tasks, to reject any role as history teacher or scholar, it cannot 
quite contain itself from proclaiming the trial’s ‘educational significance’ and ‘educational value.’” Id. at 82. 
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translate into or are meaningful within a social collective.  Law may also be focused on minute 
evidentiary details that may seem meaningless to a public hungry for dramatic developments.  
The danger is not in boredom per se but in how it affects a trial’s impact upon collective 
memory, as it decreases the likelihood that significant attention will be paid to legal 
developments and thereby diminishes the impact of such proceedings on collective memory.   
Finally, the very legal practices through which an event is interrogated may constrain the 
impact of a trial upon collective memory.  Evidentiary and procedural rules mandate that 
evidence be introduced in very specific ways, and limit elicited testimony to forms of 
questioning acceptable on direct or cross-examination.  A criminal prosecution is the story of a 
crime, and not a story of that crime’s effects, which means that the victims’ story is left out, or at 
least put aside until sentencing.  Attendants at legal proceedings hear about the defendant and 
sometimes hear from the defendant as well, but information about the victim is largely confined 
to “objective” evidence such as the nature and characteristics of injuries and markings, and rarely 
if ever hear about the victim or the victim’s family before sentencing, when victim impact 
testimony may be given.  Thus, the legal narrative is a necessarily incomplete narrative.  Other 
institutional actors, such as historians or sociologists, must step in to supplement the historical 
record of events whose memory consists largely of a legal record focused on objective proof of 
the crime and not the subjective experience of the event.  When subjective testimony is permitted 
into legal inquiry, confrontational means of eliciting and challenging testimony may directly 
contrast with the sacrosanct status that testimony—and witnesses—are accorded in collective 
memory, where proof is not prioritized.40  Finally, law does not explicitly acknowledge its 
socially constructed nature, unlike “fickle”41 collective memory.  Legal reluctance to 
acknowledge the primacy of social construction stems from its needs for finality and fixation; 
legal doctrines such as “res judicata, collateral estoppel, stare decisis, double jeopardy, 
mandatory joinder, statutes of limitations, and restrictive standards of appellate review” are 
designed to discourage or thwart altogether the subsequent reinterpretation of precedent.42  The 
only situation in which legal practitioners overtly acknowledge constructive processes is the act 
of legal “interpretation.”43 
As a result of the mismatch between the means to law’s ends and the formation of 
collective memory, law is caught between a need to maintain the legitimacy of its institutional 
narratives and satisfying diverse justice “needs.”  Law as an institution, then, cannot bear the 
weight of collective memory alone.  Instead, law contributes to organic processes of collective 
sense-making.  As law sees itself as an institution with the potential to shape collective memory, 
it becomes changed by that potential, aware of and thus more vulnerable to the same movements 
that influence collective memory formation.  Postmodernism has brought new challenges to the 
collective sense-making processes, including problematizing the primacy of legal proceedings as 
a storying forum.  Similarly, law has subjected itself to obligations owed to new, previously 
excluded populations such as victims’ families.  Legal conclusions must now “affirm as well-
warranted the victims’ feelings of resentment and indignation, for this affirmation is the only 
way for society at large to show that it acknowledges and take seriously their condition as 
victims.”44  
                                                 
40
 Id. at 104. 
41
 Id. at 217. 
42
 Id. at 216. 
43
 Id. at 242. 
44
 Id. at 273. 
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III.  VOLUNTARY BLOOD RELATIONS  
 
The focus of our attention must now shift from the social construction of memory to 
mnemetic processes themselves, what Halbwachs termed the social frameworks of memory, 
because the act of social construction—the social articulation and maintenance of memory—
occurs in groups.45  The memory practices of groups constitute attempts to interpret and assign 
meaning to culturally contested issues.  Here, “collective” denotes the membership of communal 
groups organized almost immediately after the Oklahoma City bombing. The bombing as an 
event abruptly birthed a memorial collective whose members were immediately instantaneously 
bound to one another by the ties of loss and the shared experience of suffering.46  It was within 
this memorial community that “interest” groups formed to pursue defined goals such as 
reforming habeas law or building a memorial.  In mediating cultural trauma, group membership 
became a form of “active grief” behavior through which “family members and survivors formed 
new communities to offer support to each other.”47  This article will focus on two of the most 
effective mnemetic groups formed in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing:  the Oklahoma 
City National Memorial Task Force, which organized the construction of the Oklahoma City 
National Memorial from 1995 to 2000, and a “habeas” group of family members and survivors 
who sought speedier executions and whose lobbying efforts culminated in the passage of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.48  Several members of the habeas group 
later banded together to lobby for the passage of the Victim Allocution Clarification Act of 
199749 clarifying the rights of victims set forth in the 1990 Victims Rights and Restitution Act 
(better known as the “Victims Bill of Rights”) so as to allow victim impact witnesses to both 
observe a trial and offer impact testimony.50   
 
A.  Members’ Mental State Upon Joining 
 
                                                 
45
 For Halbwachs, collective frameworks are not “constructed after the fact by the combination of individual 
recollections” but are the “instruments used by the collective memory to reconstruct an image of the past which is in 
accordance, in each epoch, with the predominant thoughts of the society.”  HALBWACHS, supra note 12, at 40. 
46
 According to Irwin-Zarecka, although the very presence of a “community of memory bonded by traumatic 
experience” in a broader collective such as a nation-state may “be enough to secure remembrance or redefine 
collective identity,” more often, there will be a transition from “unspoken bonding to outspoken (and frequently 
institutionalized) activity that the community of memory acquires public resonance…. but others, especially as the 
years go by, find it essential to record their experience, to create memorial markers for those who had died, to talk to 
the young, to join groups or associations.”  IWONA IRWIN-ZARECKA, FRAMES OF REMEMBRANCE:  THE DYNAMICS OF 
COLLECTIVE MEMORY 51 (1994). 
47
 EDWARD LENINTHAL, THE UNFINISHED BOMBING:  OKLAHOMA CITY IN AMERICAN MEMORY 98 (2001). 
48
 S. Res. 735, 104th Congress (1996).  Title I of the Act substantially amended federal habeas corpus law (as it 
applies to both state and federal prisoners whether on death row or imprisoned for a term of years) by a) barring 
federal habeas reconsideration of most legal and factual issues ruled upon by state courts; creating a general 1 year 
statute of limitations and a 6 month statute of limitation in capital cases, and requiring the approval of an appellate 
court for repetitious habeas petitions.   
49
 H.R. 924, 105th Congress (1997). 
50
 Of the participant population, six were members of the habeas group, and 17 were members of the memorial task 
force. 
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Group joining behaviors took place at a time when family members and survivors were in 
an extremely vulnerable mental state.  Complicated or traumatic grief51 was rampant, and trauma 
also resulted from the loss of a perceived “just world” prior to the bombing.52  Simply put, 
murder is disorder.53  Common emotional experiences of participants54 prior to group 
membership include feelings of alienation and loss of control, simplification of moral categories, 
a need for information about the bombing, and anger towards the perpetrators.  Crucially, 
participants were joined groups either to overcome these emotional obstacles or to find positive 
outlets for  potentially destructive energies. 
Survivors of traumatic events, including murder victims’ family members, often feel 
increasingly alienated in their wake, and perceive that they are unable to connect with the 
everyday world around them.55  This pervasive helplessness and loneliness may take forms that 
are physical, such as the inability to control physical behavior (e.g., spontaneous weeping in 
“inappropriate” locales), or social, such as loss of established routines and avoidance by former 
social acquaintances immediately after the event or at a point where victims fail to “bounce 
back” as expected.56  Homicide also creates a sense of “unfinished emotional and practical 
business which will cloud subsequent recollections, prevent the possibility of a fitting farewell, 
and lead to a continuing sense of the presence of the dead.”57  In an effort to restore control and 
prevent future losses, survivors may adopt a practice of “keeping vigil” for the dead, behaviors 
that maintain the traumatic pitch of post-disaster life as well as create needs to protest injustice, 
to keep others safe from harm, and to resist loss of meaning, and to remember and represent the 
dead or wounded.58 In addition, complex moral schemas break down in the collapse of meaning 
following homicide, devolving into radically stripped and simplified evaluative mechanisms that 
paint the world in absolutist tones of good and evil.59  Survivors, then, are defined in opposition 
                                                 
51
 According to Rando, complicated mourning arises from the nature of a homicidal death—its suddenness, 
violence, trauma, and horror, and preventability—as well as survivors’ feelings of anger, guilt, self-blame, and 
shattered assumptions.  See THERESE A. RANDO, TREATMENT OF COMPLICATED MOURNING (1993). 
52
 The “just world hypothesis” posits that “individuals have a need to believe that they live in a world where people 
generally get what they deserve” in order to “confront his physical and social environment as through they were 
stable and orderly” and “commit himself to the pursuit of long-range goals or even to the socially regulated behavior 
of day-to-day life.”  M.J. Lerner & D.T. Miller, Just World Research and the Attribution Process:  Looking Back 
and Ahead, PSYCHOL. BULL. No. 85, at 1030 (1978). 
53
 “Major bereavement is not calm, appraising, and rational.  It is instead at once a physical, emotional, and 
symbolic process that is built around a bewildering cacophony of intense sensations that suffuses fields of 
experience.”  Id. at 40. 
54
 Again, the term “participants” is used to refer to interviewees, and not to group participants who did not 
participate in the research project. 
55
 Not only do survivors feel a “loss of interest in the world without the loved one,” but they also feel isolated from 
the “experience of frustration felt by others with the bereaved person’s continued suffering, to the extent that this 
isolation interferes with natural healing processes.  M. Katherine Shear et al., The Syndrome of Traumatic Grief and 
its Treatment, in PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS:  GROUP APPROACHES TO TREATMENT 327 
(Leon A. Schein et al. eds., 2006). 
56
 See PAUL ROCK, AFTER HOMICIDE:  PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL RESPONSES TO BEREAVEMENT 31-42 (1998). 
57
 Id. at 39. 
58
 Melissa S. Wattenberg et al., Present-Centered Supportive Group Therapy for Trauma Survivors, in 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS:  GROUP APPROACHES TO TREATMENT 568 (Leon A. Schein 
et al. eds., 2006). 
59
 As Rock notes, “in their fervour and sense of urgency, in their anger and bewilderment, most survivors could have 
had no patience with anything but a simple and certain morality, and they turned to unambiguous schemes that 
would subdue doubt, establish firm boundaries between order and disorder, expel confusion, and point to directions 
for action.”  ROCK, supra note 56, at 101.  Reconstructed moral schemas can sometimes have archetypal or mythic 
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not to the deceased victim but to the perpetrator, and each evolves its meaning from its 
relationship to the other.  Significantly, survivors perceive this relationship as inequitable.  
Survivors also experience a desperate need for information, which is perceived as a key 
ingredient in undertaking life reconstruction.  Because one cannot move forward without 
thoroughly understanding insofar as possible the circumstances of the murder, information about 
the crime and perpetrator is precious.  Information is power, and the best way of gathering it is 
often by attending legal proceedings.60  Finally, anger is of course the prototypical survivor 
response; one thinks of survivors as angry voices demanding vengeance against the murderer.  
Anger, then, is not only an emotion but an activity of “self assertion and of accusation.”61  Anger 
is purposive and “intentional, establishing not only the angry subject but also the object against 
which the anger is directed.”62  Anger is an important activity for survivors simply because it 
motivates and orients survivors toward a goal, encouraging them to once again assert control.  
Thus, in acting from anger, survivors perform anger, and live in the anger experience.63   
 
B.  Group Functions 
 
Groups formed in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing served three primary 
mnemetic functions for their members:  providing companionship, serving as sites for narrative 
and norm construction, and providing opportunities for action and goal accomplishment.  
Regarding companionship, group bonding can be a powerful antidote to feelings of isolation or 
alienation, offering companionate stability and solidarity.  Theories of group therapy for those 
afflicted by traumatic grief are based on the understanding that members may feel the kind of 
understanding and safety that is often missing from their natural social network.64  Attending 
group meetings was the first time in which participants took stock of their social network in the 
sense of realizing who else had survived the bombing, or how everyone else was faring 
physically and emotionally; in the words of participants, group meetings were “reunions.”  For 
family members, meeting survivors who had known their loved ones was especially important.  
In addition, after the bombing, participants’ paramount need was to speak with other survivors or 
family members.  For five participants, the bonds of companionship were so strong that fellow 
group members became “family,” and often replaced family support networks that were 
weakened or altogether absent.  When asked about the benefits of group membership, nine 
participants reported that family members either did not want to talk about the bombing, did not 
understand the true impact of the bombing upon their lives, or placed ill-fitting limits upon 
“proper” coping strategies.  Groups also provided listening ears to satisfy the imperative to share 
experiences of loss.  Coming together as a group, however, was not always an easy or productive 
process; the first years after the bombing were marked by tensions between family members and 
survivors and between supporters and opponents of the death penalty. 
In addition to being sources of companionship and camaraderie, groups that formed in the 
wake of the Oklahoma City bombing were also “storying” sites where narratives of the bombing 
                                                                                                                                                             
proportions; Rock notes, ““it was as if on occasion survivors were recapitulating the plot of some very ancient myth, 
moral disorder turning to order, flux to structure . . .”  Id. 
60
 “Survivors thereby sought information, a restoration of control, and an end to the marginality which magnified 
their feelings of powerlessness and kept them apart from important sources of understanding.”  Id. at 99. 
61
 Id. at 101. 
62
 Id. at 102. 
63
 Id. at 49. 
64
 Shear et al., supra note 55, at 327. 
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and of its perpetrators were continually constructed.  Key to mnemetic processes were members’ 
ability to meet others with similar experiences, to join a normative community, and to gather 
information.  In addition to playing an important companionship role, talking through the event 
with others who “were there” was important in sense-making processes.  The need to find others 
with similar experiences is so integral to recovery that it is one of the chief purposes of group 
therapy for traumatic grief.65  Exchanging stories also created a set of normative expectations or 
assumptions as to “who” a group was and what it stood for.  Simplified moral schemas 
developed by homicide survivors very soon after losing a loved one to murder actually become 
incorporated into homicide survivor groups, and perpetuated within group culture.66  Finally, 
group meetings also were forums where members could learn of and discuss the latest 
developments in memorial construction and in the prosecutions of McVeigh and Nichols.  
Information gathering and commensurate sense-making was an important part of initiating 
mnemetic processes, what participants spoke of as “putting the pieces of a puzzle back together.”  
As a result of interaction, participants were able to collectively impose a narrative meaning upon 
grief, and describe learning how to speak of the bombing and exchanging stories with others as 
“healing” and “cathartic.”   
Finally, processes of life reconstruction became enmeshed with group goals.  
Accomplishing a goal such as the passage of habeas legislation or the building of the memorial 
provided an outlet for anger-motivated activity.  Family members of victims killed in other 
instances of terrorism have used anger as a unifying force; Rock remarks that “it was with anger 
that people came together….Lockerbie relatives group was formed in March within a few 
months and the first few meetings.”67  When united, survivors and family members were a potent 
advocacy force, as families of homicide victims have often been.68  Members were able to see 
how particular group goals both aligned with members’ unique interests after the bombing and 
fulfilled members’ personal needs for certain kinds of activity.  Accomplishing group goals aided 
members to once more regain a sense of control and overcome perceived helplessness; for 
instance, participants describe being empowered by the habeas group’s successful lobbying for 
the passage of habeas reform.  Significantly, different groups fulfilled different functions.  
Whereas the memorial task force allowed participants to remember murdered victims, the habeas 
group was about achieving justice.  Of course, group goals were also seen by members as worthy 
accomplishments in their own right independent of their healing potential; participants described 
the memorial as a truth-telling mechanism, a site that was symbolic of the culture of Oklahoma 
City, and as a monument to a creative use of destructive forces and to the healing process itself.  
Group members themselves remain intensely proud of goal accomplishment, describing the 
passage of the AEDPA in 1996 was “a miracle in most of our eyes,” and participation in the 
memorial process as “quite an honor.”  Goal achievement as a point in time also designated an 
appropriate moment for members to transition into lives reconstructed in the process of trying to 
accomplish a certain end; as beneficial as group membership was, there came a time when some 
members felt that involvement was no longer necessary.  Moving forward often created the 
incentive to cease intense involvement on bombing-related activities. 
 
C.  Effects of Group Membership on Perceived “Justice Needs” 
                                                 
65
 Id. at 326. 
66
 ROCK, supra note 56, at 103. 
67
 Id. at 47 
68
 Id. at xiii. 
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Groups—and group goals—affected the degree to which members felt that attending 
various stages of legal proceedings, including McVeigh’s execution, was personally meaningful, 
particularly in comparison with other possible activities such as work, involvement in non-legal 
activities, and family time.  In essence, then, members’ “justice needs”—consisting of the hoped-
for outcomes of the legal proceedings, attainment of accountability, and the desired impact of 
proceedings upon finality, remembrance and recovery—were partially constructed through the 
formation of group identity and the selection of group goals.   
The memorial task force indisputably had a very different focus than the habeas group; it 
endeavored to remember and represent murdered victims as well as living survivors and rescue 
workers, and focused on making these memorial constructions as full and robust as possible.  
Thus, the memorial task force pursued a goal centered around creating and ensuring a  presence, 
not an absence.  In so doing, it strove to give voice to the dead and the living, a voice that 
emphasized tragedy and turmoil but also rebirth and rebuilding through remembrance.  
Significantly, these voices belonged only to those victimized by the bombing; the Oklahoma City 
Memorial marginalized the presence of McVeigh and Nichols.  The only museum display 
describing prosecutory proceedings is a two-panel installation entitled “Justice” that includes 
chronological timelines of the prosecutions along with sketches from the trials and blowups of 
three newspaper articles.  There is no mention of McVeigh’s execution with the exception of a 
nondescript 4-by-8-inch bronze plaque that was installed within an hour of McVeigh’s death.  
The habeas group, in contrast, may have pursued death penalty reform in the names of murdered 
loved ones, but its primary focus was on what surviving family members of murder victims had 
to endure through waiting as long as seventeen years for an offender’s execution to be carried 
out.  Thus, the habeas group prioritized the justice of eradicating opportunities for offenders such 
as McVeigh to pursue additional appeals which prolonged execution—a focus on the offender 
and on the need to expeditiously carry out death sentences, albeit one pursued in the names of 
murder victims and their families.   
In keeping with these goals, core members of the memorial group were likely to find the 
building of the memorial or the guilty verdict in the McVeigh trial more meaningful than the 
execution.  By the time of the execution in June of 2001, more memorial task force members 
stated that they were too involved in family or work or other activities that they perceived as 
positive and “healthy” to attend the execution.  Habeas group members, on the other hand, were 
more likely to see both the trial and execution as meaningful, and characterized the execution as 
the culmination of legal proceedings.  Habeas group members not only spoke of a need to see as 
much of the legal proceedings as possible, but also verbalized a need to be involved in 
proceedings for reasons of completion and because members had struggled to ensure broader 
access to proceedings (i.e., ensuring that victim impact witnesses could attend evidence 
presentation in the case in chief, ensuring that the trial was broadcast back to Oklahoma City 
after the change of venue, ensuring that the execution would be broadcast back to Oklahoma City 
from Terra Haute).  Thus, since group goals were healing, choosing a goal for many members 
defined not only a major mnemetic focus, but also defined a moment in time—the 
accomplishment of the goal—after which members felt comfortable leaving behind both intense 
involvement with the group and preoccupation with the bombing and its legacy.  As Participant 
27 stated, “after about the fifth anniversary, when they opened the Memorial, and the Memorial 
got off and running, I sort of didn’t feel like it was as therapeutic anymore.”  Reconstruction was 
complete only after the building of the memorial or McVeigh’s trial and/or execution.  Group 
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goals also influenced which institution would “enable” healing, namely the memorial or the 
criminal justice system.  Goal selection also reflected informed judgments about what was the 
most appropriate way to memorialize the bombing, those murdered, and the bombing’s impact 
on survivors, rescue workers, and family members.   
The difference between the memorial group and the habeas group can most 
conservatively be characterized as a rhetorical difference—in how members spoke of the 
meaningfulness of legal proceedings versus other possible time investments.  It is not surprising 
that memorial task force members who opposed the death penalty stated that they did not need an 
execution for “justice” to be attained.  It is surprising, however, that whereas all habeas group 
members speak of a need to attend and be involved in legal proceedings for various reasons, 
some memorial task force members who either supported the death penalty either all the time, 
held “no opinion,” or supported it on a case-by-case basis do not mention that the trial and 
execution were particularly meaningful proceedings.  In contrast, all  participants who were 
members of the habeas group felt that attending the trial and/or execution were important steps in 
being “involved” in the process or “made a difference.”  Habeas members’ widespread support 
for legal proceedings is not shocking; the habeas group, which at an approximate maximum 
membership of 30 was much smaller than the memorial group with its hundreds of members, 
was explicitly formed to be an advocacy group and was comprised of individuals who literally 
dedicated themselves to that end.  The memorial goals of the memorial task force did not overlap 
with legal proceedings against McVeigh and Nichols; the task force only had to conceive of a 
way to represent these proceedings in a display that illustrated their significance to the Oklahoma 
City community and indeed to the national and international community.  In contrast, members 
of the habeas group explicitly sought to change legal proceedings in several different ways and 
so from its inception the group focus was on legal proceedings.  Thus, statements made by 
habeas group members attesting to the importance of attending McVeigh’s trial and execution 
directly contrast with the statements of memorial task force members who elected not to attend 
the trial and/or the execution, choosing instead to prioritize of other concerns such as work and 
family.    
 
IV.  INVOLUNTARY BLOOD RELATIONS 
 
 A.  The Source of the Involuntary Victim-Offender Relationship 
 
Collective memory usually derives from more traditional group formations, such as the 
memorial task force and habeas group.  But another type of relationship also proved to be 
significant in the context of the Oklahoma City bombing.  The reconstruction of memory in the 
wake of the bombing was also heavily influenced by an involuntary relationship that existed 
between family members and survivors on the one hand and McVeigh and Nichols on the other, 
a relationship that existed even though neither party knew the other prior to the murderous act, a 
relationship that like any other is communicative, structured through speech and silence.  This 
relationship is rarely tacitly acknowledged let alone explicitly defined in criminological 
scholarship, and is a concept that is completely logical when one looks at factors that affect the 
presence and strength of this relationship—publicity about the offender and the murder, the 
victims’ families’ need to know “why” and “how” the crime occurred and the necessity of 
understanding the offender to answer those questions at least in part.  How could victims’ 
families help but feel they know an offender through the plethora of intimate details that emerges 
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through contemporary media coverage?  Sharp notes that coverage of Jeffrey Dahmer’s murders 
extended to the most banal details of his personal life:  “the type of beer he drank, his cigarette 
preference, the types of potato chips he ate, and the brand of baking soda he used in his 
refrigerator.”69  This relationship may extend to offenders’ families as well; offenders and their 
families (and even offenders’ communities) may be roped together into a category of otherness, 
set apart by disgust and hatred, with offenders’ family members experiencing intensely negative 
publicity.70  In the context of the Oklahoma City bombing, this was a relationship in which 
victims’ impressions of McVeigh as a man and, in some cases, as a monster contextualized his 
mannerisms and his statements.  It was a relationship characterized by perceptions of 
communicative iniquity, inequity and inequality, in which victims/survivors perceived they had 
little communicative control over McVeigh, where McVeigh was seen to have great 
communicative agency and an ability to communicate with victims/survivors despite their 
antipathy towards such efforts, while victims had to settle for channeling their own 
communications through media or through victim impact testimony.  It was a relationship 
pregnant with communicative necessity and perceived obligation, in which victims very much 
wanted to hear “why” and how McVeigh carried out the bombing and yearned in many cases71 to 
speak with him in person.  Finally, it was a relationship whose only possibility of termination lay 
in the death of McVeigh or of victims themselves.   
In addition, this involuntary relationship between McVeigh and family members and 
survivors profoundly influenced the formation of collective memory and the resolution of 
cultural trauma because it was perceived as a challenge to the reconstruction of identity through 
group and individual processes such as those discussed in the previous chapter.  As will be 
discussed shortly, because of the constructed understandings of McVeigh that participants 
evolved, ten participants directly referred to McVeigh’s continued existence and media 
communications as barriers on the road to “recovery” and resolution and connected his execution 
with the need to silence him.72  A living Timothy McVeigh was simultaneously a reminder of his 
potential to “jab” at victims, a reminder of the bombing, and a reminder of injustice.  In 
occupying one camp in the involuntary relationship between victim’s family/survivor and 
offender, and therefore bound to victims’ family members and survivors, McVeigh became a 
part of the collective, instead of being cast outside it.  The inclusion of McVeigh in the collective 
was traumatizing to family members and survivors because it directly affected the narrative 
resolution of the trauma and delayed family members’ and survivors’ control over the resolution 
process because at any time a message could issue from McVeigh that could potentially 
aggravate wounds just starting to scab over.  Communication could not cease and the 
relationship could not be terminated until McVeigh was dead.  Thus, the collective memory of 
homicide—including the collective memory of the Oklahoma City bombing—is shaped not only 
by the events of the murder but also for the duration of the involuntary relationship between 
offender and family members/survivors. 
                                                 
69
 SUSAN F. SHARP, HIDDEN VICTIMS:  THE EFFECTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY ON FAMILIES OF THE ACCUSED 1 
(2005). 
70
 Id. at 36. 
71
 Eleven participants were willing to meet with McVeigh, 12 did not want to meet with McVeigh, and 4 were 
unsure whether or not they would have been willing to take this step. 
72
 Emblematic of these comments are the remarks of Participant 25:  McVeigh . . . was defiant . . . . He would speak 
out to the media.  He would tell the families to grow up . . . .  And everything that he did was doing nothing but 
hurting the family members here in Oklahoma.  So the only way for us to have any kind of peace was to execute this 
man.” 
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It is possible to describe the tie between family members and survivors and McVeigh in 
other ways besides terming it a “relationship.”  Framing it in relational terms, however, is most 
fitting because of it captures the profound way in which these ties colored family members’ and 
survivors’ processes of sense-making, particularly in formulating their preferred legal resolution 
to the bombing—what punishment was deserved.  Focusing research on the victim-offender 
relationship also appropriately recognizes that victims and survivors define as well as become 
defined by the experiences of survivorship, that they act upon and are acted upon in turn.  It 
implies an exchange, a give and take of activity and passivity, and recognizes that processes of 
sensemaking are mutually constructive and cyclical, and not self-constructive and linear.  
Victims change and alter conceptions of grieving in the course of healing; they are active 
participants in the trial with the potential to change its practices and potentials; and they 
challenge representations of victims in addition to conforming to existing representations.  
Finally, refocusing research on the victim-offender relationship also effectively organizes how 
participants made sense of the chaos of post-bombing social relations.  It explains why the vast 
majority of participants regardless of political views on the death penalty felt relief in the wake 
of the execution which terminated the involuntary relationship that had begun six years before.   
In the wake of the bombing, family members and survivors became involuntarily and 
intimately linked to McVeigh and Nichols through the offense, so that they must “live with” the 
them to a greater or lesser extent until death—either the offender’s, or their own.  As Janice 
Smith, a nonparticipant and nonwitness family member whose brother was murdered in the 
bombing, stated in a media interview after McVeigh’s execution on June 11, 2001, “It's over. We 
don't have to continue with him any more.”73  There may even be a sense that family members 
and survivors are an offender’s “audience” and an interactive positioning based on this 
perception.  Constance Richardson, a nonparticipant family member whose 20-year old daughter 
was murdered in the bombing, chose to visit the memorial on the morning of June 11, 2001 
instead of witnessing the execution by closed-circuit, stating “I didn’t want to be part of his 
audience.”74   
Intensive interviews with family members and survivors reveal a perception that 
statements made by McVeigh were targeted to these individuals to further wound them.  
Participant 21 states, “like every time he turned around, he was doing some thing to jab at us and 
it was just very painful because he could sit there behind those bars and get us three squares a 
day and everything and not have all these worries and, and he kept jabbing at us in his own little 
way.”  After McVeigh was executed, however, the “jabbing” ceased; as Participant 15 explains, 
“I never think about McVeigh now that he’s been executed cause he’s not in the media now. You 
know he played the media and the media played him and he was there….I’ve quit completely, 
stopped thinking about him the day they executed him. He’s you know he’s hurt me enough and 
he doesn’t care. Not at all.”  Participant 25’s comments are most illustrative of this point:   
 
McVeigh, even though he knew that he was getting the death sentence, he was 
defiant all the way up to the point where it actually happened, okay?  He would 
speak out to the media…..And everything that he did was doing nothing but 
hurting the family members here in Oklahoma….Nichols, Nichols is a little 
different because since he’s been tried and convicted, you don’t hear about 
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 Nick Bryant, Pain Remains For McVeigh Victims, BBC, June 11, 2001, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1383171.stm. 
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him….I can live with him being in prison for the rest of his life, for the simple 
reason that he is not defiant and he’s not going out and getting on the news and 
so forth and trying to hurt the family members.75   
 
Participants also perceived that this relationship was intimate in the sense that McVeigh 
as a communicative agent made statements to family members and survivors in an attempt to 
further wound them.  Participants speak of McVeigh jabbing “at us,” of McVeigh hurting “me” 
and “telling the families,” and of McVeigh and Nichols having “access to the family members, 
survivors through the media, through books.”  In addition, participants seem at times to assert 
that they “knew” what McVeigh would do in a given situation; thirteen participants, for instance, 
remarked that McVeigh would not have sincerely meant any apology that he may have given at 
his execution. 
 It is considerably easier to understand the interpersonal process of collective memory 
construction in a social setting such as the memorial task force or the habeas group, where most 
communicative interaction is face-to-face, and not mediated.  It is more difficult to comprehend a 
“relationship” that forms in a completely mediated context, in the utter absence of direct 
communication.  Such a relationship is not “interpersonal” in the traditional sense of the term, 
involving “at least two communicators; intentionally orienting toward each other; as both subject 
and object; whose actions embody each other’s perspectives both toward self and toward 
other.”76  Yet, there is a tangible perception on the part of family members of survivors of 
intimacy, of “knowing” McVeigh and Nichols, that would be present in an interpersonal 
relationship.   
 
 B.  McVeigh as Para-Social Enemy 
 
 This relationship bears a strong resemblance to para-social interaction, a concept devised 
in 1956 by Horton and Wohl in seeking to explain the phenomenon of television viewers’ 
perceived relationship to television personalities, defined as “the illusion of face-to-face 
relationship with the performer" in which “the conditions of response to the performer are 
analogous to those in a primary group.”77  This relationship is built upon a cumulative 
“exchange” of affective messages between the personality, termed the “persona,” and the 
audience, whereby the audience is “subtly insinuated into the program's action and internal social 
relationships and, by dint of this kind of staging, is ambiguously transformed into a group which 
observes and participate in the show by turns.”78  Para-social relationships are characterized by a 
“lack of effective reciprocity" since “the interaction, characteristically, is one-sided, 
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nondialectical, controlled by the performer, and not susceptible of mutual development"; thus, 
"the audience is free to choose among the relationships offered, but it cannot create new ones."79  
Other ways in which audience members may communicate to the persona or to show producers, 
such as letters or telephone calls, “lie outside the para-social interaction itself.”80  Despite the 
lack of communicative give and take, the persona who is the focus of the para-social relationship 
becomes integrated into the audience member’s social circle as a familiar presence”81 
Significantly, this presence is above all a reliable presence.82  But however artless this 
relationship may appear, it is also a strategic and constant one.83  Producers formulate the 
persona’s character specifically to enhance audience members’ loyalty to the persona, with 
respect to the personality’s image, “its major theme is that the performer should be loved and 
admired.”84  Audience members are expected to adapt to the engineered relational format with 
the persona as it is offered; they may not alter it, and so must continue the relation on those 
inflexible terms.85  Thus, audience members must be susceptible to a “coaching of attitudes.”86  
But audience members’ willingness to be susceptible to this coaching is entailed in audience 
membership itself, since that role entails some level of identification.  Subsequent research into 
para-social relationships further suggests that this illusory intimacy, the subjective creation of 
audience members, is actually taken as “real.”87  Para-social relationships continue to pervade 
media usage today.88 
 It is abundantly clear that researchers have construed the persona that is the target of the 
para-social relation as being in the position of a para-social “friend,” someone who is likeable 
and trustworthy.  Thus, this type of investiture can be termed a “positive” para-social 
relationship, or a investiture of positive affect in a persona.  But logically, if one can have 
relationships with para-social “friends,” then one may also have relationships with para-social 
“enemies,” opening the door to the formation of “negative” para-social relationships.  Negative 
para-social relations have the same characteristics as their positive counterparts, though these 
characteristics form an identification that is the inverse of that encouraged by the positive 
relation.  As in Herbert and Wohl’s conception of the positive para-social relation that prompts 
audience members to be loyal to a media persona, a para-social relation with an “enemy” 
likewise frames spectators’ perceptions of the performer, enabling persistent dislike and 
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animosity.  Whereas the positive para-social persona is an “ingroup” member, a desirable 
associate, the para-social enemy is an outsider, a deviant Other.  Victims are as encouraged to be 
loyal to their hatred of criminal personas as audience members are encouraged to admire their 
media personas.  The criminal persona is as enduring a figure as a positive persona, engendered 
to predictably inspire loathing.  And audience members who form negative attachments to para-
social enemies also must accept the relational format imposed by the media “producers” who 
construct that persona.  Realizing how negative para-social relations are cultivated also 
necessitates broadening the concepts of “media” and “media producer,” extending them from 
application in the narrower context of mass media to application in the broader context of social 
institutions who may take on strategic mediating roles—including the criminal justice system.  
This means that the producers of para-social enemies in the context of homicide are not only the 
producers of hit television crime dramas but also criminal justice officials who orchestrate the 
arrest and trial of criminal offenders from the “perp walk” to incarceration or execution, the 
public rituals for exposing and judging “enemies of the system.” 
 But gauging from participants’ attributions of malicious communicative intent to 
McVeigh and the degree to which their responses attributed a dialogic character to their 
interactions with McVeigh, it is clear that there is ample evidence of a negative para-social 
relation between family members and survivors and McVeigh.  McVeigh is their para-social 
enemy, the one who, however mediated his communications may be, both has the potential to 
communicate and actually communicates with the intent of inflicting further harm on an 
especially vulnerable and wounded population. 
 The intimacy of this negative para-social relation is particularly ironic in light of the 
impersonal nature of the Oklahoma City bombing itself.  McVeigh saw himself as standing in 
opposition to the United States government, at the narrowest opposing the government agencies 
involved in Waco and Ruby Ridge, and explained that he chose to bomb the Murrah Federal 
Building because he thought that it would make a spectacular media target, not out of personal 
animosity toward anyone who worked in the building or anything housed in the building.  Yet, 
the bombing immediately became intensely personal, as images brought to life stories such as the 
iconic image of the dead Baylee Almon, the one-year-old baby girl cradled in the arms of 
Oklahoma City firefighter Chris Fields.  The impersonality of the bombing was an 
incomprehensible affront to family members and survivors, who could not see it as impersonal, 
and in asking the unanswerable question “why,” sought to learn, “why us.”   
Because para-social identification is enhanced or discouraged by the construction of 
mediated images of a persona, the visual technology of mediated images plays a key role in the 
formation of such relationships.  Joshua Meyrowitz contends that an affective relationship can be 
encouraged by the composition of a television shot, arguing that the para-social identification of 
viewers with viewed personae is enhanced by technological reproduction of key interpersonal 
proxemic distances.  According to Meyrowitz, there is a “visual ‘relationship’ between the 
viewer and the image” which exists for the duration of the television viewing.89  This 
relationship is altered by the “framing variable,” or the distance at which a shot places the viewer 
from the viewed.90  Each variety of shot has a para-social consequence:  “actions in long shots, 
for example, tend to be viewed in terms of abstract ‘events,’ while close-ups focus attention on 
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personal characteristics and response.”91  Meyrowitz further divides television views of subjects 
into two categories, portrayed objective distance” which “‘maintains the role of a detached 
observer’ of the action” and “portrayed subjective distance” which ‘assumes the point of view of 
one of the characters’” and “shows the viewer what one person within the action sees.”92   
Applying these theories to media coverage of McVeigh facilitates insight into how 
McVeigh came to be constructed as a para-social enemy.  Media coverage of McVeigh can be 
limited to two “moments”:  shots of McVeigh being escorted to and from the courthouse in 
Oklahoma City by law enforcement, and an Emmy-award winning interview that aired March 
13, 2000 which Ed Bradley conducted with McVeigh for “Sixty Minutes” while McVeigh was 
incarcerated on death row in federal prison.  The “perp walk” shots most certainly portrayed 
McVeigh in the “front region” role of criminal and social enemy.  Thus, it is not surprising that 
McVeigh’s profile from these “perp walk” shots later became the centerpiece of news graphics 
headlining execution stories.  Ed Bradley’s “60 Minutes” interview, on the other hand, allowed 
McVeigh to explain himself in his own words, yet the interview alternated between camera shots 
of McVeigh captured over Bradley’s shoulder, positioning the viewer in the interrogator’s chair, 
and close-ups of McVeigh’s facial expression.  In addition, the image from McVeigh’s 
Oklahoma “perp walk” was the dominant photograph of him used in media coverage of the 
Oklahoma City bombing, and was often incorporated into news graphics, as in the following 
examples of online news graphics and images from execution coverage and images from print 
media.  McVeigh’s gaze was also highlighted by textual descriptions of these very same images.  
Early media stories described McVeigh’s expression as that of “hard eyes unlit by the faintest 
flicker of emotion,” the look of a man whose “name didn't mean much then but the image did,” 
the stare of “a poker-faced killer in a crewcut.”93  This first impression resurfaced continually, 
including on the morning of his execution:  “[i]n his last moments, his face was as blank as it 
was that April day six years ago when America first saw him escorted out of an Oklahoma jail.”94  
Thus, early media constructions of McVeigh were cyclically incorporated into subsequent 
constructions, snowballing upon one another to produce a coherent image of McVeigh as para-
social enemy. 
The degree to which McVeigh’s stare is incorporated into media images and the way in 
which McVeigh himself was framed during the “60 Minutes” interview illustrates how crucial 
this gaze became in the construction of McVeigh as a para-social enemy.  The heavy media 
focus on the “perp walk” images could very easily have influenced the early impression 
formation of family members and survivors, socially constructing expectancies regarding the 
import of his communicative behaviors.  Impression formation upon initial acquaintance is rapid, 
or even instant, as the subconscious makes its “highly stereotypic” impressions.95  Because what 
can be gleaned from introductory verbal exchanges is restricted by convention, nonverbal cues 
such as “stable physical appearance and kinesic and vocalic cues” are especially significant in 
“shaping interpersonal expectations and in generating a frame for the parties’ interpretation of 
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subsequent behavior.  Fortunately, “thin slice” methodology96 has shown that interactants require 
only very brief glimpses of behavior to form “fairly accurate and strong” judgments of actors.97  
The rapidity of impression formation is necessary because humans are “driven by an underlying 
need for uncertainty reduction” and by a need for sensemaking.98   
Thus, the moment when family members and survivors were “introduced” to McVeigh 
via media broadcast of the “perp walk” was very likely the moment that they formed initial 
impressions.  Significantly, this footage or still shots from it were rebroadcast extremely 
frequently in ensuing years, thus reinforcing the visual cues from which the initial impression 
was formed.  Three of the eight execution witnesses remarked on the similarities between 
McVeigh’s gaze during the execution and his gaze on previous occasions captured and aired on 
television; as Participant 22 recalled, “[h]e didn’t just look.  He had that same look in his eyes 
when they arrested him. Do you remember him coming out of the court house and that stern look 
on his face?  That’s the look he had. . . . . Like defiant.”99  Such comments reveal not only that 
witnesses were aware of how McVeigh was constructed in and by the news media as a person 
and an offender, but that they found these constructions meaningful. 
 
V.  ENDURING PARA-SOCIAL LEGACIES:  IMPRESSIONS OF MCVEIGH’S CONDUCT AT TRIAL  
 
Family members’ and survivors’ initial impressions of McVeigh formed as a result of 
pre-trial images such as the “perp walk” were “confirmed” by their impressions of his behavior 
at trial.  The most frequent characterizations of McVeigh at his trial all reflect an “inappropriate” 
emotion or reaction to the trial event; McVeigh is described variously as inappropriately jocular, 
sarcastic, arrogant, unemotional and unremorseful.  Presumably, the ideal defendant should be 
solemn, respectful, remorseful, and intimidated by the machinations of justice moving against 
him.  These very same qualities appear in the most frequent characterizations of Nichols, 
wherein Nichols is emotional, shamed, quiet, and nervous.   
 
A.  Perceptions of McVeigh’s Conduct at Trial  
 
One of the most pervasive trial witness characterizations of McVeigh was as an 
unemotional defendant whose reactions were nonexistent or impossible to interpret, and 
connected this blankness of expression to moral failing such as dishonesty, arrogance, 
callousness, and even evil.100  This coldness also evoked an impression of arrogance; Participant 
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8 stated “He is a cold son-of-a-bitch and he sat there arrogant and looking like he was enjoying 
the show,” and 24 noted, ““He was almost proud, I felt like, proud of what he had accomplished, 
what he had done.”   
Seven participants recall being struck by McVeigh’s perceived jocularity:101  These 
moments of perceived jocularity and informality contrasted with other moments in which 
participants apprehended that McVeigh was paying a great deal of attention to the 
proceedings.102  
 
 B.  Perceptions of Nichols’ Conduct at Trial 
 
Trial witnesses characterized Nichols’ conduct as the opposite of McVeigh’s behavior.  
Participant 25 noticed a “very definite” difference between McVeigh’s and Nichols’ courtroom 
presences, and that that difference individualized the defendants:  “it made us look at both of 
them as individuals. . . . So you could tell that they was two different individuals altogether.”  
 Participants reported that Nichols was more emotional than McVeigh.  Participant 2 and 
24 stated that of Nichols that “he seemed to be more emotional,” and Participant 8 stated that 
“you could see emotions on his face.”  According to Participant 24, this emotion was elicited by 
the trial:  “I felt like things that were said or done not necessarily by me during my testimony but 
by maybe others, victim impact, that kind of thing, that there were times when he was very 
emotional.” 
Participants also credited Nichols with displaying situationally appropriate emotions.  
Participant 8 stated that Nichols appeared to be “uncomfortable, scared, guilty . . . He looked 
very frightened.”  Participant 25 also characterized Nichols as afraid:  “But most of the time he 
was, how would you say, he was...looked like he was a little afraid about what was going to 
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happen than anything.”  And Participant 28 described Nichols as “a little more nervous.”  
Participant 24 stated that Nichols may have felt shame:  “I also felt like that McVeigh was proud 
of what he did and I felt like that Nichols was maybe more ashamed of what he couldn’t have 
stopped from doing.”  For Participant 29, this display of emotion was a sign of humanity:  “And I 
hate to give him credit for this but you kind of see a person in Nichols.”  Nichols was also 
quieter, according to Participant 25:  “more the quiet, refined individual, who sat there and didn’t 
say a heck of a lot or didn’t do a lot.  He would write notes to his lawyer every once in a while.”  
Participant 28 stated that he was more serious:  “He didn’t…he wasn’t the jokester whatever.  I 
mean he was just…he didn’t…he did lean over and talk to his attorneys and but he didn’t do the 
waving at people and the laughing and you know, he did not do that.  He was much more 
serious.”  Participant 29 described Nichols as “resigned.” 
 
C. Dissatisfaction With Limited Access to McVeigh Through Trial Proceedings  
 
Participants often wanted to meet with McVeigh outside of the trial forum.  This suggests 
that the constraints placed upon the victim-offender relationship and the accountability process 
by the criminal justice institution also unfortunately constrained memory work, and that 
participants wanted to escape these institutional constraints upon access to McVeigh and/or as to 
the types of queries that were asked and answered.  This includes an unwillingness to entirely 
defer to the criminal justice system as arbiter of guilt and innocence.  There was a sense that 
seeing McVeigh in person would confirm guilt; for instance, Participant 8 attended trial 
proceedings in person because “I had to see for myself I mean all the media was telling you was 
that he was guilty but I had to look at him and know and I knew if I looked at him I'd know if he 
was guilty or not no matter what the jury came back with . . .”  Other participants expressed 
disappointment with the questioning limitations of the trial’s narrow guilt/innocence inquiry;   
Participant 25 wanted to ask other questions that had not yet been answered:  “I wanted to find 
out why, with the questions that I had, not some lawyer or the judge or whatever asking him.  I 
wanted to ask my own questions.”  Finally, the fact that trial attendees’ access to McVeigh was 
mediated by the trial forum and direct access was foreclosed could be frustrating to participants; 
three participants spontaneously remarked on the constraints imposed by legal procedures and in 
legal venues.  Participant 25 stated, “it would have been nice to have been able to ask, personally 
ask and not have to, you know, go through a lawyer . . . just to say you know, why did you do 
that?  What were you thinking?  What did you think you were going to accomplish?”  These 
reactions to the encountering McVeigh through the trial forum illustrate the limited efficacy of 
criminal trials as vehicles of individual, and therefore collective, memory. 
 
VI.  THE COMMUNICATIVE RAMIFICATIONS OF MCVEIGH’S EXECUTION 
 
 Like McVeigh’s conduct during media interviews and trial, his behaviors at the execution 
continued to heavily influence family members’ and survivors’ collective memory of his identity 
as a perpetrator of the bombing (Was he repentant?  Was he defiant?) and thus to color the ways 
in which they made sense of the final legal stages of the bombing.103 
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A.  Understanding the Execution as Communicative Interaction 
 
It may seem odd at first to speak of an execution as a communicative act, which will 
herein be defined as a specific episode in which someone is engaged in meaning-making by 
drawing on enculturated systems of communicative practices, the underlying sociocultural 
systems or toolboxes from which we strategically choose spoke, written, or gestural behaviors.  
Human communication is not a transmission of transparent meaning but a negotiated exchange 
of meaning.  Communication does not take place in a vacuum but in a social context seething 
with entities that may either facilitate or hinder human interaction.  Differing cultural 
backgrounds or ideological assumptions may result in deviating perceptions as easily as does a 
noisy environment or technological malfunction.  A communicative framework of action and 
reaction is the ideal means by which to address punishment in general, capital punishment in 
particular, and the execution as a specific imposition of capital punishment.  Criminal law’s 
efficacy itself presumes the existence of communication, expressions that some actions are 
illegal and that those commit crimes will be punished.  That we all understand what actions are 
illegal is proof that those concepts have been successfully communicated to us.  As a state-
instituted ritual, punishment is a social act, and capital punishment is its most extreme form.   
Thus, an execution is both communicative action and an event with social consequences.  
An execution is the enactment of the pronounced death sentence.  The state is the primary actor 
in the execution ritual that outlines, regulates, and supervises the execution though the execution 
is carried out in the name of the people.  The state actor communicates both with and through the 
condemned to reach the immediate witnesses and more remote audiences exposed to the 
execution through media.  The state’s expression to the condemned is a unique punitive message.  
Usually punishment is meant to express censure, and a “don’t do it again” warning.  Here, the 
object of the punishment won’t live to learn his lesson, so one can infer that the state’s ultimate 
communicative target is not the condemned but the witnesses to the execution. 
The condemned plays a remarkably passive role in the execution process.  The execution 
is designed to subordinate the will of the individual to the will of the state, reenacting the 
contract between the governed and the governing.  Punitive acts, then, are the means by which 
the state seeks to “prevent the despotic spirit . . . from plunging the laws of society into its 
original chaos.”104  Executions are the ultimate confirmation of this reposited popular power over 
the body of the infractor.  The state has codified its gatekeeping role in carrying out the 
execution, most notably for our purposes in 28 C.F.R. § 26,4(f), which prohibits photographic, 
audio, and visual recording devices at federal executions.105   
Significantly, “execution finally puts the body beyond the possibility of social 
control.”106  Social control over the social person must cease upon death, but social control over 
the body can continue in perpetuity.  But until the moment of execution, the body is the site and 
target of the most rigid forms of social control.  The state imprisons the condemned until the date 
of his death, and impresses additional restrictions upon his final moments.  Since the days of 
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public hangings, prisoners have often been hooded or masked “to spare spectators the sight of the 
condemned person’s distorted or disfigured features,” and after the electric chair replaced the 
noose, leather face masks concealed the condemned’s features.107  When lethal injection is used, 
the prisoner’s body is often sanitized by a sheet cover, and the prisoner lays supine upon a 
gurney so that witnesses see only one side of his features.  In McVeigh’s execution, the closed-
circuit camera was suspended directly over his head, so that witnesses had an unobstructed view 
of his features.   
The state also restrains the condemned’s final expressions and actions.  Formerly, “at 
large spectacles and at small private executions as well, the prisoner was made a part of the ritual 
by being offered an opportunity to deliver his final words.”108  Now, however, this privilege has 
been “gradually withdrawn” because “there is a fear that he will say something nasty that will 
disrupt the proceedings,”109 and in some cases, the prisoner is only permitted to write his last 
words.110   
Finally, the physical space in which the execution is carried out further emphasizes that 
the state is the primary actor and others but incidentally connected to the act.  According to 
Foucalt, the execution, once a “pure event” and “collective spectacle,” moved out of view with 
the invention of the prison organization.  Death was dissected into silent and rehearsed routine 
processes, “a sequence of technical modifications” to make it “instantaneous” and 
“unobtrusive.”111  The very existence of the witness room distances witnesses from the 
invocation and metaphysical and physical consequences of the execution; witnesses become 
bystanders because of the distance imposed by concrete and glass.  The layout of the witness 
rooms further regulates witnesses’ impressions and responses and structures the execution as a 
distant communicative event, allowing the state to “minimize the fascination of looking by 
effecting death as mechanically and as precisely as possible.”112 
 
B.  Deconstructing the Gaze 
 
1.  The Marked Gaze 
 
Witnesses literally attend and attend to an execution on the basis of general 
communicative expectancies.  Such dynamics are activated when the condemned invites or 
opens an interaction by either looking into the witness rooms or by addressing witnesses through 
“last words.”  Often, the condemned does make some communicative endeavors, but rarely 
makes the gestures that witnesses most desire.  In exploring the interactive dimensions of the 
McVeigh execution, we come first to the importance of his visual awareness of witnesses 
established through gaze.  Witnesses in the death chamber reported that, when the curtain was 
opened, McVeigh physically lifted his head and slowly stared into three of the four witness 
rooms wherein sat his own witnesses, bombing victims, and media witnesses.  There is some 
question whether McVeigh stared into the room reserved for government witnesses.  Persons in 
all of these rooms but the offender witness room were concealed by a one-way glass.  McVeigh 
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then lay back down and stared up at the ceiling, into the closed circuit camera.  This active visual 
engagement with witnesses was noted by all three participants who witnessed the execution live 
in Terra Haute, and all five remote witnesses believed that McVeigh was staring directly at them.   
Execution witnesses are often intensely interested in watching the offender’s face 
throughout the procedure, to the point that corrective measures may have to be taken when 
logistics such as the location of the gurney vis-à-vis the victim witnessing room and the girth of 
the defendant combine to make this impossible.113  Interviews with witnesses who viewed 
McVeigh’s execution by closed circuit reveal that witnesses felt that the placement of the camera 
directly over the gurney in Terre Haute was ideal because it allowed them to clearly see 
McVeigh’s facial expressions.  The desire to see McVeigh face-to-face fueled some witnesses’ 
desire to view the execution.  When asked about the desire to see the execution in person, 
Participant 25 remarked in a media interview five days before the execution: 
 
I'm hoping that if I can see his face maybe I can get some kind of idea exactly 
who he is and what he thinks….Stare him in the eye and I hope he stares me 
back. I'm hoping that if I can see his face maybe I can get some kind of idea 
exactly who he is and what he thinks.114 
 
Closed circuit witnesses report being “shocked” or “jarred” by the sudden sight of 
McVeigh’ face on the screen.  But this shock did not prevent most witnesses from unhesitatingly 
endorsing this placement.  Participant 5’s spouse states, “I’m glad I saw him that close up and 
everything cause that way I knew from his eyes and his expression what he was feeling.”  
Participant 15 stated, “I wanted to see his face.”   Participant 21 credits a spiritual experience of 
forgiveness that she underwent during the execution to the being able to see McVeigh’s face:  “I 
think the face thing is what, really brought it to reality with me. . . . it was a face-to-face thing 
and I think that’s probably what drew me in to what I needed to go through.”  The two closed 
circuit witnesses who wanted to see a more inclusive picture stated that they wanted to see more 
of what was going on in the execution chamber.   
Interviews with witnesses manifest that McVeigh’s gazing behaviors gave rise to an 
intense perception among closed circuit witnesses that McVeigh was aware that his death was 
being witnessed, that he wanted to create a certain image, and that his gazing behavior produced 
an interactional expectancy.  Closed circuit witnesses believed that McVeigh was staring at them 
through the camera and that he was conscious of their presence.  Larry Whicher, a closed circuit 
witness, stated in a media interview immediately after the execution that McVeigh “actually 
lifted his head and looked directly into the camera and it was as if he was looking directly at us.”  
Whicher described his stare as “totally expressionless, blank stare—and his eyes were 
unblinking,…he didn't need to make a statement. I truly believe that his eyes were telling me he 
had a look of defiance and that if he could he'd do it all again.115  Participant 5’s spouse also 
sensed that McVeigh was aware that he was being watched:  “He knew that people were looking 
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at him, watching him . . .”  When McVeigh’s face appeared on the screen, it seemed to 
Participant 7 that he was looking at the witnesses in the viewing rooms.116  Not only did 
witnesses feel that McVeigh was aware of live and closed circuit witnesses, but there was a 
definite perception that McVeigh was actually and purposefully looking at all witnesses, whether 
they viewed live or by closed circuit.  Participant 21 stated that “he raised his head up and I mean 
he kind of did like this and it was almost like he was just staring at each person. . . . and it was 
something he did on purpose.”  21 described the sight of McVeigh’s face as intimate, stating 
“It’s almost like it was a face-to-face contact with him.” Participant 22 stated that when 
McVeigh’s face, 22’s reaction was, “there’s his face looking at you” (emphasis added).  
Participant 28 perceived that McVeigh was not only aware of witnesses’ presence and that his 
gaze seemed to penetrate through the mediated images to reach witnesses:   
 
And as he stared at the camera, knowing that we were watching, I mean he 
knew, he knew. . . . . And but I…you know, he…he would just stare at that 
camera.  And it was just…like it was just he was just staring right through 
you.  I mean absolutely everyone said the same thing.  It looked like he was 
looking right at you, like he was looking right at me.   
 
Witnesses in the death chamber in Terre Haute had a different experience of McVeigh 
than witnesses who viewed via closed-circuit television.  Participant 25 stated that McVeigh 
“glared into the room, you know, trying to figure out who was who, who was in there and where 
we were standing at.”  Participant 29 recalled that McVeigh raised his head in an effort to look at 
victim witnesses, although it was unexpected:  “I never expected him to look at us. And then… it 
was like drum roll. His head turns to his right. He rolls over and he looks at all of us. Or at our 
window.  Four, maybe five second and then turns his head back.”  Live witnesses, then, only had 
seconds of perceived eye contact with McVeigh. 
In the closed-circuit image, McVeigh was lying on his back and so his gaze defaulted to 
the ceiling, making it unclear whether he was looking at the camera, the ceiling, the remote 
witnesses, both, or neither.  The remote witnesses, however, did impose meaning upon that gaze, 
and perhaps even felt its full impact even though they were the most removed.  As closed circuit 
witness Larry Whicher stated in a media interview immediately following the execution:  “I 
think that stare in the camera is something that will stay with me . . . .It won't haunt me, but I 
think it will be a memory that will stay with me and make me think there are others like that in 
the world.”117   
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2.  The Social Consequences of the Gaze 
 
For sighted people, gaze is an important social behavior.118  Of course, “looking at others 
and being looked by them, is of central importance in social behavior, for those who can see.”119  
Above all else, a gaze conveys visual attention.120  In a classic 1967 study of eye gaze, Kendon 
proposed that eye contact had three functions, the first two of which are directly relevant here:  to 
express emotion, monitor others’ actions, and regulate conversational flow.121  Similarly, Argyle 
found that eye contact signaled the level of intimacy which existed between two interactants; the 
greater the eye contact, the closer the relationship between them.122  Mutual gaze is also 
physiologically arousing; Mazur et al found that mutual gaze between experimental participants 
caused more arousal (measured by “strong, significant, and consistent drops” in thumb blood 
volume, or TBV, which measures the quantity of blood moving from the “periphery of the body 
to the heart, lungs, and large muscles”) than control conditions of nonmutual gaze.123   
Because of McVeigh’s gazing behavior, witnesses perceived that he was both conscious 
of and paid careful attention to their presence.  McVeigh’s staring behavior was likely marked 
for closed circuit witnesses because it was interpreted as unexpected behavior or a breach of 
social norms.124  According to Kendon, 11 out of 20 subjects in an experimental interview 
situation spontaneously commented on variations in an interviewer’s gaze pattern when it 
deviated from normal, whereas none mentioned the gaze when the interviewer’s gaze patterns 
remained normal.125  If these findings with respect to gaze in an interpersonal context may be 
extended to other non-face-to-face interactions, then attendees’ frequent commentary on 
McVeigh’s gaze may be an indication that his gaze was an unexpected behavior, or that it was 
interpreted as deviant or in breach of social norms.   
Having established that McVeigh’s gaze was socially significant, we may begin to 
explore what exactly it signified and how it positioned McVeigh vis a vis the witnesses; in other 
words, we may explicate the social consequences of the gaze.  The most obvious element that a 
gaze conveys is visual attention.126  It is McVeigh’s gesture of straining to gaze into each witness 
room that informed witnesses of his conscious and careful attention to and awareness of their 
presence.  Logically, witnesses who were in the death chamber in Terre Haute may have had a 
more immediate or intimate encounter with McVeigh than witnesses who viewed the execution 
via closed-circuit television because of the close physical proximity.  McVeigh was reclining on 
his back so that his gaze was directed upwards to the ceiling as a matter of course, and so it is 
unclear whether his upturned gaze was into the camera (and through its lens to the witnesses in 
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Oklahoma City) was targeted at the ceiling, the remote witnesses, both, or neither.  However, it 
was the remote witnesses who viewed McVeigh’s face throughout the entire procedure who 
imposed the meaning upon that gaze, just as the death chamber witnesses assigned meaning to 
McVeigh’s physical gaze into the witness rooms.  Ironically, it was the remote witnesses who 
felt the full impact of McVeigh’s gaze. 
Thus, visual attention can act as a summons, and an attentive gaze may be the indication 
that a communicative interaction is starting or is likely to start.  Because of its attentive 
properties, a gaze unites persons who were previously inattentive both towards each other and to 
the interactive potential that arrived with an awareness of the gaze.  This interpersonal unity is 
there even if the motivation that engendered the gaze divides its participants, as in the case of an 
openly hostile stare.  When a gaze thus serves as a trigger for attention, communicative 
expectancies are a logical corollary.127  In effect, then, the gaze constitutes a summons to pay 
attention because the gazer is paying attention, implying that attention is a reciprocal behavior. 
The attentive gaze also objectifies its target.  According to Merleau-Ponty, people can be 
“stripped of existence” or “transformed into an object” by “being looked at by someone who 
dares not strike up any relationship.”128  Thus, a gaze that is an invitation to attention (and 
therefore to awareness of attention) but is not an invitation to further communicative interaction 
is a truly objectifying gaze, a behavior which has significant social consequences and positioning 
effects for its target. 
A gaze may also signify an attempt to establish dominance.  Evidence suggests that status 
is determined very soon within an interaction, from the first 15 seconds to 1 minute, instead of 
emerging over a longer term.129  Staring behavior is commonly interpreted as assertive in a wide 
range of cultures, and empirical research has illustrated shown that staring behavior can be 
perceived as threatening or dominating.130  Stares are likely to be perceived as showing anger, 
aggression or assertiveness when accompanied by lowered eyebrows.131  The experimental 
findings of Mazur et al suggest that mutual gazes accompanied by lowered brows were more 
physiologically arousing than mutual gazes accompanied by raised brows; declines in subjects’ 
TBV were “significantly deeper” in the lowered brow situations.132  Mazur et al found that 
participants’ level of comfort with staring behavior was a “strong predictor” of dominance in 
subsequent interactions, with participants who reported being more comfortable with the scale 
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taking a dominant role in subsequent conversation and decision making tasks.133  In a 
communicative purposes related to assertions of dominance, gazes can also communicate threat 
or challenge.134 
The positioning effect of a gaze can also result from an active “staring down” which puts 
the subject “in her place,” or may result from deviant behavior that violates norms of interaction 
and thus provides discomfort in the subject.  For instance, “staring on the part of strangers 
constitutes a bizarre piece of rule-breaking, whose meaning is unclear, from which the person 
stared at might well want to escape.”135  The interpretation of a gaze, like the meaning of other 
nonverbal signals, is heavily dependent on its social context, how actors define the situation.136  
An execution setting is not the same type of interaction as a friendly chat between friends; the 
condemned’s past behavior has in some way opposed him to those who witness his execution 
either because they were somehow harmed by him (survivors or family members of victims) or 
because they are there to commemorate the consequences of his transgression (media and 
government witnesses).  This explains why McVeigh’s gaze was interpreted as confrontational 
or defiant, particularly when interpreted in light of his silence at the warden’s request for “last 
words.”  Such a confrontational gaze connotes animosity and dominance and implies emotion 
and power roles:   “looks can express aggression and hostility, and can also evoke it.”137   
Witness responses suggest that McVeigh’s gaze could have been perceived as one of two 
particularly aggressive gazing behaviors, a “stare down” or a “hate stare.”  A stare down is a 
“dominance encounter” in which one party decides to hold another’s gaze so that it becomes a 
staring contest in which each interactant attempt to outstress the other that ends only when one 
party looks away.138  Participant 8 wanted to stare down McVeigh when 8 attended his trial in 
Denver:  “I just stared at him I said I'm gonna stare at you until you look me in the eye and he 
did.  And I said I'm not going to, you're going to look away before I do.”  An especially 
antagonistic gaze that Goffman termed the “hate stare” is a deliberate breach of the nonstaring 
accord between strangers that Goffman terms “civil inattention.”139  The hate stare is “insulting 
partly because it implies the person stared at doesn’t really count as a person at all.”140  This 
perspective prioritizes the “deliberate breaking of the social norm.”141  Both of the consequences 
of the hate stare parallel likely consequences of McVeigh’s gaze:  objectifying the targets of the 
gaze, and its deviance from social norms.  Such a gaze implies that the gazer is dominant and has 
the right to stare at and impose upon the target of his gaze.  In studies of dominance, increased 
looking by a person makes him or her appear more dominant to others.   
 
3.  Witnesses’ Perception of a Communicative Gaze 
 
The execution did indeed have communicative dimensions for most witnesses, so much 
so that one journalist was prompted to refer to McVeigh’s gaze as “a look they will long 
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remember, the long hard stare into the camera,” that was comprised of a “blankness” and an 
“unblinking gaze.”142  Closed circuit witnesses most certainly perceived that McVeigh was 
attempting to send a message.  Witnesses described McVeigh’s expression as either 
confrontational (“staring” into the camera), or “stern” or “defiant” (“I’ve seen it a lot in my 
grandchildren.  You know that kind of defiance of ah, you can whip me if you want to but it’s 
not hurting.”) or as overtly malicious, terming it a “go to hell” or “eat shit and die” expression, 
one that “just spit on us all some more,” and an “evil” expression.143  For Participant 22, 
McVeigh’s expression was so defiant that a relaxation in his facial posture was the preeminent 
physical sign of his death; 22 could sense that he had passed “because the facial expression 
changed” where “he was so defiant until the end.”   Witnesses also stated that McVeigh’s face 
registered pride or arrogance, describing it as “triumphant,” a “fuck you all, I won” look, one that 
said “I did the right thing and I’m not sorry” or “I’m willing to die for my idea.”  Ironically, 
witnesses further described McVeigh’s expression as registering absence, explaining that it was 
blank (“nothing”), unremorseful (“no remorse”), uncaring (“didn’t give a flip,” “didn’t care”) 
and free of suffering (“you’re not hurting me”, “no sign of discomfort,” “showed no pain”).   
Interpreting McVeigh’s gaze as communicative certainly had interpersonal consequences 
from survivors, from angering them to disappointing them to hurting them further or, in a more 
positive direction, enabling forgiveness.  Participant 25 stated in a media interview following the 
execution that “What I was hoping for, and I'm sure most of us were, we could see some kind of, 
maybe, 'I'm sorry,"' he said. "You know, something like that.   We didn't get anything from his 
face.”144  Similarly Participant 15 stated, “he died like he didn’t care and I cried because of that, 
because he did not care.”  Participant 5 stated in a media interview following the execution that 
“He got the final word . . . . I thought I would feel something more satisfying."145  This 
perception was echoed by Jay Sawyer, a nonparticipant closed-circuit witness whose mother was 
murdered in the bombing, who stated in a media interview, "[w]ithout saying anything he got the 
final word, absolutely. His teeth were clenched, just like when he was first arrested. His teeth 
were clenched, his lips were pursed and just a blank stare. It was the same today."146  But 
according to Participant 21, confronting McVeigh face to face is what enabled 21 to have an 
intensely spiritual experience in which 21 forgave McVeigh.147 
It is immediately apparent that perceptions of McVeigh as defiant are confined to remote 
witnesses who saw McVeigh’s face throughout the execution procedure.  Surprisingly, live 
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witnesses who viewed the execution in Terre Haute did not sense either that McVeigh was 
attempting to communicate with witnesses or what he was attempting to communicate.  
Participant 25 stated that McVeigh “glared” into the victim witness room, “trying to figure out 
who was who, who was in there and where we were standing at,” but 25 did not interpret 
anything significant in McVeigh’s expression other than confusion.  In a media interview 
immediately following the execution, Participant 25 had stated, “we didn't get anything from his 
face. His facial expressions were just about as calm as they could be.”148  Participant 29 also 
recalled McVeigh’s prolonged gaze into the victim witness window, but other than 
characterizing that look as being akin to a “glare,” 29 does not know whether McVeigh was 
“trying to give us [live witnesses] something.”  Live witnesses may have wished for more 
communicative interaction; survivor Anthony Scott, another live execution witness, stated in a 
media interview immediately following the execution that “I wish that there might have been eye 
to eye contact, but he couldn't see us.”149  Participant 25’s disappointment was also evident, “I 
was hoping to look at this man, but it didn't work guys. So we went with what we felt like going 
in.”150  This communicative ambiguity may have made it difficult for live witnesses to categorize 
McVeigh’s emotional state at the moment of his execution.  As Participant 25 stated in a media 
interview, “I mean he's not a monster, guys. I mean not when you're looking at him in the face. I 
mean he's just a regular human being.  But, you know, there's no facial expressions on him 
whatsoever so there was no way of knowing just exactly what he is and how he is.”   
 Still other closed circuit witnesses revealed in media interviews or statements that 
McVeigh exhibited signs of fear.  Survivor Calvin Moser stated “To me, he had the look of, ‘I'm 
not in control of this. As much as I've criticized the government, the government has me.’”151  
Oneta Johnson, a family member, stated that “He looked up and stared at us, but I saw his jaw 
quiver.”152 
Witnesses, whether live or closed circuit, wanted to respond communicatively in turn to 
McVeigh’s gaze.153  Significantly, the one closed circuit witness who stated that it was not 
meaningful that McVeigh could not actually see other witnesses believed that only “someone 
who has a lot of vengeance would want that.”  Strikingly, two of the live witnesses brought in 
small photographs of their murdered loved ones and held the photographs up against the glass 
during the execution.  Participant 29 brought a photograph of 29’s murdered sibling.  While 
entering the witnessing room in Terra Haute, Participant 29 was in the front row, and placed it up 
to the glass; Participant 29 described how another witness did the same thing with a photograph 
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of a murdered child.154  When asked whether it was “almost like not only were you witnessing 
but it was also like your brother was also witnessing,” Participant 29 replied “Yeah, that’s why I 
did it. Symbolically I felt that way, yeah.”  
 
C.  Dimensions of Silence 
 
Silence has a multitude of meanings.  It may be “a sign of someone’s power or control 
over others, or it may be a sign of a person’s weakness and submission,” it may be “a state in 
which one gains knowledge, or it may be a state of idle ignorance or unlearning.”155  “Affection, 
reverence, attention, hesitation, and other states and emotions are ordinarily and naturally 
communicated through silence.”156  Jaworski states that silence is a “highly ambiguous” form of 
communication as “it does not manifest any particular assumptions in a strong way” and so “is 
more open for the audience to speculate about which assumption(s) the communicator had in 
mind to make manifest or more manifest in his or her use of silence.”157  Therefore, we must 
reject a simplistic view of silence as merely a counter to speech, an absence defined as such 
because it is bereft of verbal presence.  Under such an impoverished perspective, “humans are 
metaphorically conceptualized as machines, and the constant ‘humming’ of the machine is 
regarded as a sign of its proper functioning,” but when the humming ceases and silence reigns, 
“the (human) machine is perceived as if it no longer work[s] well.”158  Under this perspective, 
wording equates to working.  However, silence does “retain the illocutionary force of speech . . . 
it is fully capable of actualizing the common speech acts of apologizing, refusing, complaining, 
questioning, etc.,” and “it is through this potential that silence can have positive or negative 
social consequences:  cohesive or devisive . . . informative and revelational.”159  Jaworski posits 
instead a conceptualization of silence that does not treat it as a “negative phenomenon with 
respect to speech” but locates both silence and speech “on a communicative continuum of forms 
. . . from most to least verbal.”160   
 We are interested here in the communicative dimensions of silence.  Therefore, it is a 
clear prerequisite that, for silence to be communicative, it must be somehow communicatively 
significant, invested with meaning.  Jaworksi posits that one person only interprets another’s 
silence when there is an interactional expectation, when “the communication process is expected 
or perceived to be taking place,” when one person intends to communicate something to 
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another.161  He then exemplifies “noncommunicative” silence by a hypothetical situation where 
two strangers pass on the street without intending to interact with one another; the lack of intent 
to communicate means that the silence is not socially meaningful.  This seems a strange notion, 
for as researchers, we would contest that this silence does have communicative meaning 
regardless of the intentions of these two strangers.  In Jaworski’s eyes, then, meaningfulness is 
constructed from the perspective of the interaction participant and not an external observer.  This 
conception of communicative silence thus presupposes communicative engagement or the 
expectation for such engagement.   
  When silence is meaningful, then, it may assume social functions.  According to Jensen 
(1973), there are five functions of silence:  a linkage function, where “silence may bond two (or 
more) people or it may separate them”;  an affecting function, where “silence may heal (over 
time) or wound”; a revelation function, where “silence may make something known to a person . 
. . or it may hide information from others”; a judgmental function, where “silence may signal 
assent and favor or it may signal dissent and disfavor”; and an activating function, where 
“silence may signal deep thoughtfulness . . . or it may signal mental inactivity.”162 
 Within the interactional context of the McVeigh execution, there are three primary 
contexts of silence:  that of the witnesses, that of McVeigh himself, and execution as a means of 
imposing silence upon McVeigh.   
 
1.  Witnesses’ Own Silence 
 
At the FAA Center in Oklahoma City, the remote site to which McVeigh’s execution was 
broadcast via closed circuit television, what talking there was took place before the execution 
began.  Three of the five remote witnesses spoke of the execution as something of a reunion or 
social gathering, a description aided by the fact that juice, coffee and fruit were provided in the 
kitchen in the back part of the viewing room.163 
The social dimensions of collectively witnessing the execution were especially apparent 
for live witnesses, some of whom traveled to Terra Haute together, and all of whom had dinner 
together the evening before the execution and breakfast the morning of the execution.    29 knew 
many of the other live witnesses:  “when I got there, this was the first time I had met [witness]  
and [witness]’s a little bit of a character and of course [witness] was there and I knew, I knew a 
couple of others which was given- you only have 10 people, that I knew about half of us was 
really weird. So we had a nice sense of camaraderie right off the bat.”  29 and other witnesses 
shared a similar attitude toward many aspects of the proceedings, including viewing in a 
humorous light the many preachers and mental health professionals present at a dinner with the 
                                                 
161
 Id. at 34. 
162
 Id. at 67. 
163
 Participant 7 recalled, “it was almost like just a little social gathering before a meeting.”  Participant 15 stated, 
“you got to see people you hadn’t seen because I quit going to survivor’s meetings and….there weren’t any 
meetings to plan the memorial and so it’s really sad that something like that you had to see those people again 
because it was the execution but it was nice seeing them again.”  Finally, Participant 21 noted,  
 
it had been a long while since a lot of us had been together and we all were there for one 
purpose. We were all there…we were able to talk and laugh and share things that have gone 
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warden the evening before the execution:  “you know we were all like- we were in a pretty good 
mood given you know what- maybe we hadn’t thought about what we’re getting ready to do, the 
gravity of it but anyway it’s just- we were… I think the people I was close to there kind of felt 
the same way….Anyway, we made a joke of it.”  According to 29, the “good mood” of witnesses 
persisted through the execution itself:  “I think there was one person and this was not even until 
we were in the room that one person seemed you know to be very solemn about it. . . . you know 
we were just kind of I don’t want to say joking and certainly not laughing but it was not a somber 
experience in that room.” 
Closed circuit witnesses describe the atmosphere in the witness room in Oklahoma City 
as being very different that the atmosphere in Terre Haute.  Despite the interactions between 
witnesses, an air of nervous anticipation was palpable.  Participant 5’s spouse stated that closed 
circuit witnesses were “milling around” “really restless” and “on edge” before the execution 
began because “their anticipation was kinda getting to them.”  Participant 21 stated that different 
witnesses awaited the execution in differing frames of mind:  “The mood in there.  There were 
some that were just, somber like me just, you know, there were some that were like, I remember 
one, one woman go, ‘This is a great day for an execution.’  I mean, you know, you had every 
feeling in there.”  Participant 22 stated that “Everybody was nervous.  I think.  I mean it 
appeared to me that everybody I talked to was pretty nervous.  One girl just passed out. She just, 
she just was too overwhelmed.  She stayed though. She got better.”  Participant 28 described 
there being “all kind of nervous talk, kind of chitchatting.” 
During the remote broadcast of the execution itself, witnesses were silent; Participants 7 
and 15 states that they were “very quiet,” and 7 stated that there was no audible crying. 
Participant 5’s spouse was allowed to describe to 5 what was going on during the closed circuit 
execution even though “everybody else was cautioned to be quiet, be orderly . . . . they didn’t 
want any outbursts or no, ah, they didn’t want any kind of clapping or yelling or loud crying or 
anything like that,” and so 5’s spouse described “real low.”  Participant 21 stated that things were 
“Very quiet, I was amazed, when he actually died. It was silent. . . . I really expected some 
people to, to have an outburst, you know, clap or something. It was very silent.”  In Terra Haute, 
however, according to Participant 25, there was some talking in the execution chamber as some 
of the female witnesses who had brought photographs made comments:  “Probably the women 
made comments about this is my husband or this is my brother or what. . . . With photographs.”  
Participant 29 also stated that one of the witnesses was speaking during the execution:  “I mean 
[witness] was ‘hey you son of a bitch over here, look at this picture.’ You know yelling at him.” 
 After the execution, 7 stated that there was an attitude of “okay it’s done, let’s move on.”  
This is precisely how live witnesses described the execution; as Participant 25 stated, “when it 
was over with, you know, they said, ‘It’s over, it’s done.’”  In Oklahoma City, there was an air of 
quiet afterwards according to Participant 28:   “everyone kind of just got up, made their way out, 
went and got in the cars.” 
 If we accept Jaworski’s proposition that silence and speech are a two ends of a 
communicative spectrum, it is easy to understand that, like speech, silence can be “situation 
specific,” depending on “the practical conventions of the event itself.”164  Such events may 
actually be interactions structured through silence.165  It thus appears that the closed circuit 
viewing of McVeigh’s execution was structured for witnesses through silence, while the live 
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viewing was either structured to a much lesser degree through silence or, more likely, was not 
structured at all through silence. 
 These statements causes us to question the nature of the “silence” that characterized the 
remote and live witnessing experiences.  It is abundantly clear that, in the live witness room, 
there was no felt need for reverent silence, as is observed at funerals.166  In such somber 
ceremonies, silence mediates status transitions; through “the reduction of the amount of 
ceremonial talk—reserved to very few high-ranking participants—the community’s silence 
manifests its unity with the absolute.”167  Instead, feelings of relief were celebrated through 
noise.   
 In view of the rather obvious somber silence one would expect would characterize 
execution witnessing, it initially seems surprising that live witnesses report that there was less 
silence in the witnessing room at Terra Haute than closed circuit witnesses report in the remote 
witnessing room in Oklahoma City.  After all, one might think that the strictures in the prison 
environment would impose silence upon the act of witnessing in Terra Haute.  This would 
suggest that the farther one gets from the event, the looser the controls over speech and silence 
during the act of witnessing become.  Clearly, participants’ remarks support the opposite of this 
observation.  An explanation may be found, however, by switching the focus from how far 
removed witnesses are from the witnessed event to whether the target of witness’ communicative 
actions is within communicative range.  Thus, it is more likely that the converse is true:  that 
closed circuit witnesses in Oklahoma City had little reason to break silence because McVeigh, 
the target of any communicative efforts they would have made, was literally remote, appearing 
through a mediated image.  It was the live witnesses standing in a room removed from McVeigh 
by only one wall who stood in communicative proximity to McVeigh.  This change in focus was 
provoked by a conversation I had with a colleague concerning the college graduation of his 
daughter.168   
 
2. Witness Perceptions of McVeigh’s Silence 
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Witnesses elect to view executions for many reasons, prominent among them being the 
longing for some sign of repentance or suffering from the condemned—an apology, an 
acknowledgment of the pain and suffering endured by those reclaiming their lives after a capital 
crime.  Thus, witnesses subject the condemned’s behavior to intense scrutiny—searching for a 
communicational opening, some sign of interactional engagement.  McVeigh did not make any 
statement, remorseful or otherwise, at the warden’s request for last words.  However, copies of 
his final written statement, a copy of the poem “Invictus” by William Ernest Henley, was 
distributed at least to media officials, since media sources reported receiving copies of the 
statement whereas no witnesses recall having received one.    
After the execution, McVeigh’s appellate attorney Robert Nigh, who had visited with the 
McVeigh prior to the execution, addressed the media to explain why his client had not made a 
final statement, stating “To the victims of Oklahoma City, I say that I am sorry, that I could not 
successfully help Tim to express words of reconciliation that he did not perceive to be 
dishonest."169  Thus, Nigh connected McVeigh’s silence to an unbending insistence that his 
actions were justified.     
Whereas some execution witnesses wanted McVeigh to say something instead of 
remaining silent, other witnesses were fearful that McVeigh would use the opportunity to hurt 
survivors and family members further.  Participant 5 just wanted McVeigh to say something 
instead of remaining silent:  “I’d liked for him to say something. . . . I don’t know.  I just liked 
for him to say something.”  Witnesses’ hope for a remorseful statement was dimmed by the 
perception that it wasn’t in his nature to apologize, perhaps because McVeigh had never seemed 
to regret the bombing.  Thus, witnesses wanted an apology yet either did not expect one or would 
not have believed McVeigh if he had apologized.  Participant 5 was not surprised when McVeigh 
did not make a remorseful statement, and stated that “I think it’d have been important if he’d 
apologized, but I don’t, I don’t think he’d meant it if he did apologize. . . . And he didn’t mean it 
even if he you know, no, no apology was really in that man as far as I could tell.”  5’s spouse 
who narrated the execution for 5 would have been surprised if an apology had been forthcoming:  
“It didn’t surprise me that he was silent.  I really, it would have surprised me if he would have 
just said anything.”  Participant 22 acknowledged a “ridiculous” hope for an apology.170 
Participant 7 is the only execution witness who was angered by McVeigh’s silence, 
particularly given his prior commitment to his “movement,” but also was not surprised that 
McVeigh chose to remain silent in view of his military training, acknowledging that McVeigh’s 
behaviors were constructed by past life experiences.171 
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 22 stated,  
 
I think also many of us who attended the execution were, you just can’t help but have this 
hope even though you know its ridiculous and that’s not going to happen you still have that 
hope you’ll say something that is remotely remorseful.  And, uh, you know, it didn’t happen.  
He was very very defiant until the last instant. 
 
171
 As Participant 7 explained,  
  
Well, it ticked me off….I thought if you’re so um, behind your movement, whatever his 
movement was, then why don’t you speak about it to the end?  You know, if you truly believe 
what you did was the right thing to do, why don’t you talk about it to the very end?....I think it 
just goes back to military training.  You just keep your mouth shut and say nothing unless 
asked and even then maybe say nothing.  
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 Two live witnesses, Participants 25 and 29, did not care whether or not McVeigh 
apologized.  Though 25 wanted McVeigh to finally reveal “what had happened and why he did 
it,” 25 states that an apology was unimportant because McVeigh would not have meant it and 
because remorse was unexpected:  “I feel like in my own mind that if this man apologized I think 
it would have been phony.  And so I didn’t really expect him to say anything like it.”  29 states 
similarly that an apology was unexpected:  “I knew he would never would so I never really 
thought about it. I- I- given his personality it was not even- that’s not even an option.” 
  Two execution witnesses were relieved that McVeigh was silent, in view of other, more 
harmful communicative choices he could have made.  Participant 21 did not only expect an 
apology, but expected McVeigh to make a statement with the intent to cause further harm.172 
Participant 28 would have appreciated an explanation of “why” McVeigh carried out the 
bombing, or a statement of remorse, but preferred McVeigh’s silence to a hurtful statement.173 
28 also was concerned that McVeigh would gasp for breath as 28’s father had done at his own 
death, and felt peace because McVeigh’s death was more peaceful.174  
In communicative interactions, the refusal to speak can be troubling and potentially toxic; 
“one’s failure to say something that is expected in a given moment by the other party can be 
interpreted as a sign of hostility or dumbness.”175  In hostile situations colored by anger and 
violence, where silence is usually thought to be the antithesis of noisy rage, silence can be a 
weapon, and “silent treatment of the opponent may be even more powerful than uttering the 
harshest of words and drives many people crazy.”176 Hence the power of the adage “turn the 
other cheek.”  How much more painful can silence as a weapon be when there is no future 
opportunity for the one who wields it to reestablish communication and contact?  When 
delivered in response to an offer or invitation, “silence is the extreme manifestation of 
indirectness” and, consequently, a strong form of disengagement, if not disregard.177  It is also a 
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I felt going in there that he was going to say something that would anger everybody. I didn’t 
expect him to confess or ask for forgiveness. I was more concerned that he was going to say 
something that had angered everybody. He had that book that was written and it was seem 
like every time he turned around, he was doing some thing to jab at us and it was just very 
painful because he could sit there behind those bars and get us three squares a day and 
everything and not have all these worries and, and he kept jabbing at us in his own little way 
and we didn’t get that with Nichols. 
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My dad struggled for every breath.  It was horrible, it was horrible to hear him.  And I was 
afraid.  That was the one thing I was afraid of, because my Dad was the only person I’d ever 
seen die.  And so I was afraid that I was going to hear the same sounds.  So maybe that gave 
me a little peace, because he just went to sleep and I didn’t hear all that.   
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“highly face-threatening act.”178  Here, silence embodies rejection—of the offer, and potentially 
of the offeror as well. 
When this request to speak/refusal to speak pattern plays out in the context of an 
execution, the condemned only has a very limited attempt to respond, and to refuse this 
invitation to give “last words” is to remain silent forever, barring a last minute reprieve.  The 
scripted regimentation of an execution protocol provides an opportunity for the warden to invite 
the “condemned” to utter any last words.179  This very request/refusal pattern played itself out in 
the McVeigh execution.  Thus, one of the obvious manifestations of a condemned body’s taboo 
status is that the condemned becomes silenced through the order-bearing protocol of the 
execution, speaking only when he is bidden, just as other taboo bodies do when subject to the 
strictures of other ceremonies, in giving vows, taking oaths, and delivering eulogies.180   
In the point-counterpoint pattern of offer and refusal, McVeigh’s silence was in effect his 
response; his reaction to the warden’s request for “last words” immediately before the process of 
lethal injection began.  McVeigh’s particular responsive intent in remaining silent is largely 
irrelevant simply because numerous witnesses found his silence to be so meaningful.  Eighteen 
participants desired some statement from McVeigh relating to his motivations, the “truth” behind 
the bombing, remorse, divine reconciliation, or admission of guilt; however, most of these 
participants commented that they did not expect McVeigh to be so forthcoming.  Yet, witnesses 
still interpreted McVeigh’s silence as pregnant with defiant meaning.   
McVeigh’s execution, as a ceremony involving change in status, posed a threat that had 
to be mediated through protocol and formulaics.  But McVeigh’s silence itself posed an 
additional threat since he did not oblige witnesses with a verbal response.  Additional insight can 
be gained into the communicative, threatening nature of McVeigh’s silence by applying the 
principles of Brown & Levinson’s Politeness Theory.  Brown and Levinson follow Goffman’s 
conception of “face,” defined as “the public self-image that every person wants to claim.”181  
Face is both “positive” and “negative,” where positive face refers to “the desire to be liked, 
appreciated and approved of by selected others,” and negative face “expresses the desire to be 
free from imposition.”182  In every interaction, “it is in the mutual interest of both participants in 
an interaction to attend to each other’s face.”183  According to Brown and Levinson, almost all 
“verbal activities”—which as the previous discussion shows would include silence—“entail a 
threat to either the positive or negative aspect of face of the addressee and/or the speaker, and are 
thus face-threatening acts (FTAs).”184  The extent of the threat is not intrinsic to the verbal act 
but is dependent upon “the social distance between the interactants, the relative power 
differential between them, and the intrinsic weight of the imposition entailed by the particular 
act.”185  A speaker will determine which verbal act to make depending on this social calculus of 
threat.   
Brown and Levinson propose five major “strategies” or choices for managing FTAs: 
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Speakers proceed through a communicative “calculus” when determining what interactive route 
to take.186 
 Witness responses suggest that McVeigh’s decision to remain silent in response to the 
request for “last words” was interpreted as an FTA within the calculus of Politeness Theory—
preserving his own face by not apologizing or otherwise undercutting his anti-government creed, 
a decision that also did not save witnesses’ face.  McVeigh at times was even credited with a 
desire to threaten witnesses’ face further.  In essence, he was either perceived to be not 
concerned with politeness, or thought to be deliberately impolite. Witnesses ascribed McVeigh’s 
choice to a conscious decision, crediting him with the choice to perform the FTA.  Thus, 
McVeigh’s silence was perceived as a strategic verbal act—demonstrating that silence and 
speech are part of the same communicative continuum, and silence is then a species of linguistic 
act.  The strategic nature of silence explains the presence of its social consequences.  As Sifianou 
states, in encounters where the participants have unequal status, “the superior’s status may 
indicate domination, whereas the inferior’s silence may indicate subordination.”187  It is the 
interaction of silence and volubility which determines the reading of the behavior.188  Even when 
witnesses do not read McVeigh’s silence in conjunction with his handwritten final statement, 
they perceive that McVeigh’s strategy did not involve negative politeness—an unwillingness to 
burden witnesses by introducing an interactive potential into the event.  Such silence was not 
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Don’t do the FTA 
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perceived as having a rapport benefit, implicating “shared mutual knowledge” and ”solidarity 
and common ground,” but a dividing quality, emphasizing unequal or imperfect knowledge and a 
disparate perspective.189   
Having examined more precisely the threatening dynamics of McVeigh’s silence, we can 
thus return to the silencing of the condemned’s taboo body.  The notion that a body is silenced 
implies that there is an authoritative agent which silences—an entity that can be responded to.  
Therefore, McVeigh’s silence, connected to his anti-government creed, was perceived by 
witnesses as both a linguistic response and an ideological response—if indeed the two can be 
separated—or perhaps more appropriately, a linguistic response dictating a social and ideological 
orientation.  This perception sheds additional light on why witnesses were not surprised by 
McVeigh’s silence.  In analyzing the silenced status of other organizational bodies such as 
dominated sociopolitical groups and political opponents whose position is potentially or actually 
threatened, that group often chooses not to engage in genuine dialogue with the superordinate 
structure, instead questioning that structure’s authority by not responding, remaining silent.  
Thus, witnesses may have thought that McVeigh utilized this strategy in responding to the “last 
words” request through silence.  Alternatively, an oppressed group may respond by speaking on 
its own terms or in its own context, breaking its silence by “choosing media of communication 
that are not controlled by the power group.”190  Witnesses were also aware that McVeigh pursued 
these strategies as well, pursuing a response in other contexts free of state protocols.  First, 
McVeigh collaborated in the publication of American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh & the 
Oklahoma City Bombing,191 an account in which McVeigh classified the bombing as an act of 
war, angering untold numbers of family members and survivors who took issue with his casual 
“collateral damage” treatment of victims, particularly children, killed in the Oklahoma City 
Bombing.  McVeigh also did an interview on “60 Minutes” which further angered survivors and 
family members.  A possible third context of which many witnesses do not appear to be aware is 
his final statement distributed to media witnesses after his death. 
  
3.  McVeigh’s Death as Imposing Silence 
 
  A third dimension of silence in Timothy McVeigh’s execution was the fact that 
McVeigh himself was now permanently silenced, an absence instead of a communicative 
presence.  A living Timothy McVeigh—both in the sense of McVeigh himself as a 
communicative presence, and the construction of McVeigh by continued media coverage—
served simultaneously as a potential to “jab” victims (as Participant 21 described it), as a 
reminder of the bombing, and as a reminder of injustice, as those who he had murdered were no 
longer alive to speak.  In addition, there was a fear that McVeigh could somehow influence 
others through media communications, and a weariness of continuously hearing the defendants’ 
names in the press; as Participant 1, a nonwitness, stated of Nichols:  “to think he’s still 
influencing people every day in the media I am tired of seeing his name appear in the Oklahoma 
newspaper and it still appears in there every few months.”  Execution is perceived by ten pro-
death penalty participants as the only way to effectively silence an offender; as Participant 24 
states, “You know, after someone is executed you are completely finished with every battle you 
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have to fight in that arena.  No more McVeigh battles to fight.  Don’t have to worry about what’s 
gonna come out in the newspaper that he said to some reporter somewhere.” 
 Eighteen nonwitnesses and witnesses experienced relief that there was silence following 
the execution.  However, participants characterize this silence very differently depending on 
whether they were for or against the death penalty.  All participants who oppose the death 
penalty speak of this relief in terms of a cessation of media activity, whereas all participants who 
are for the death penalty state that it was an end to McVeigh’s actual presence—his silence, not 
that of the media—that was the crucial factor.  This suggests that participants who supported the 
death penalty felt that their relationship with McVeigh as para-social enemy was somehow more 
threatening. 
 Both nonwitnesses and witnesses who supported the death penalty expressed relief from 
McVeigh’s death.  Participant 1, a nonwitness survivor, stated, “when those people are executed 
and you know they’re gone, there, there is a change for the people that were victims of that 
crime.  It’s gotta be better.  It was for me.”  Most participants who were for the death penalty 
specifically connected this relief to either McVeigh’s ability to no longer speak with the intent to 
harm others or his ability to incidentally harm others in speaking.  In these statements, survivors 
and family members are positioned as being affected by communications from the offender(s), 
and are thus accorded a quasi-participant status in these interchanges.  Participants also 
acknowledged that McVeigh was the subject and not the origin of media coverage was also 
problematic and hurtful; as Participant 24, a nonwitness survivor, remarked, “[a]nd part of that 
[the inability to entirely leave behind the emotional entanglement with offenders] without 
blaming the media, part of that was the media because…. every time you write a story, every 
time you, you know, question what happened or who was involved and those kind of things, 
those lesions were always there period.”  Similarly, 16 was thankful that “I don’t hear his name 
constantly for the rest of my life.”   
Nonwitnesses who supported the death penalty also experienced relief that McVeigh was 
silenced.  Describing her relief after the execution, Participant 8, a nonwitness whose best friend 
was killed in the bombing, stated that “It's still death but yeah there was that relief.  We don't 
have to hear his crap anymore.  He can't he can't hurt us.  He's gone.  He got what he deserved. . . 
. You know he can't write no books any more, he can't grant no interviews . . . .”  8 would have 
felt differently had McVeigh remained alive, with the potential to keep speaking:  “I think that 
would have been harder because he would’ve, you would’ve heard things.  Every now and then 
I'm sure he would’ve wrote something or talked to a reporter or you know it would have been in 
your face for life.”  For that reason, 8 only could forgive McVeigh “[w]hen his mouth was shut.”  
Participant 12, a critically-injured survivor and nonwitness, felt a physical relief from McVeigh’s 
silence:  “But the interesting thing to me is that uh when, when McVeigh was killed I felt a huge 
sense of relief….I think physically it was a major uh benefit to me, and uh I think spiritually um 
he’s not making headlines, no one is reading his letters in the newspaper, like the bomber the 
clinic, abortion clinic bomber.”  Speaking about a recent statement that Nichols had released 
from prison, 12 compared Nichols to the infamous murderer Charles Manson, stating “he 
[Nichols] should be dead, he shouldn’t be capable of speaking, and I knew that this was 
something that could happen because Manson is alive. And he’s still impacting people and….and 
that shouldn’t happen, and that can’t happen for McVeigh, he’s gone.”  12 stated that life 
imprisonment should mean an inability to communicate with others:  “to me, life imprisonment 
would be cruel and unusual punishment, because they should not see another living human 
being, they should not be able to communicate with another human being.”  12 connects an 
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offender’s ability to communicate with the ability to impact victims and survivors:  “I don’t care 
what they do, it’s what they say, if they can impact, affect have any type of bearing on any other 
human being, it’s wrong. And if they’re dead, they can’t do that.” 
Execution witnesses who supported the death penalty also focused on McVeigh as a 
communicative agent in expressing relief in the aftermath of his execution.  Participant 15, a 
survivor and closed circuit witness, spoke in terms of silencing McVeigh:  “I don’t have to listen 
to his mouth ever again, ever….That’s what I wanted. You know I wanted someone to silence 
him because all he did was hurt people still and he got his kicks out of it and there was nothing.”  
For Participant 25, McVeigh’s willingness to use the media to continue to inflict harm on family 
members and survivors was one reason why 25 felt McVeigh needed to be executed, in contrast 
to Nichols, whose quiet prison presence met that 25 could “live with” his continued existence.192 
Similarly, Participant 28, a family member and closed circuit witness, found the execution  
meaningful in terms of the silence of McVeigh:  “I wanted him to be silenced and I saw him 
being silenced.”193  Finally, for Participant 29, a live witness, the execution ended McVeigh’s 
presence:  “I felt a real peace….because I’m not carrying him in my head. He’s gone. He’s out of 
my head now. And that’s more room for [29’s sibling]. To think I have to share room with that 
son of a bitch with such a nice guy like my [sibling]. That sucks.”   
Participant 21, one of the few who expressed no opinion on the death penalty, also 
explained the sense of relief after the execution in terms of terminating McVeigh’s potential as a 
communicative agent:  “Um the jabbing is what I am very happy has stopped . . . Because that 
was a very, very painful when he came out and said the children were collateral damage and it 
was like, that was so hard on the families.” 
 Participants who were against the death penalty, on the other hand, described their sense 
of relief as emanating from the termination of media coverage from McVeigh, and not the death 
of McVeigh in itself.  Participant 3, a survivor and nonwitness, stated that “I just wanted the 
media to quit talking about it [the execution] . . . . I just wanted some return to, as much return to 
normalcy as I could have.”  But 3 stated that, while cessation of media coverage was an 
improvement, coverage would have “died down” if McVeigh had been given life imprisonment, 
as it had with respect to Nichols.  11 also stated that it was media coverage was kept 11 on 
                                                 
192
 Participant 25 stated,  
 
McVeigh, even though he knew that he was getting the death sentence, he was defiant all the 
way up to the point where it actually happened, okay?  He would speak out to the media.  He 
would tell the families to grow up, it’s collateral damage that we killed your kids, you know.  
And everything that he did was doing nothing but hurting the family members here in 
Oklahoma.  So the only way for us to have any kind of peace was to execute this man.  Now 
on Nichols, Nichols is a little different because since he’s been tried and convicted, you don’t 
hear about him.  And so even though he was ninety percent involved . . . I can live with him 
being in prison for the rest of his life, for the simple reason that he is not defiant and he’s not 
going out and getting on the news and so forth and trying to hurt the family members.   
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 Participant 28’s full statement was: 
 
Seeing it through and to know that he really was silenced.  That he really is dead.  I saw him 
die.  It can’t be any of this - we saw President Kennedy on a yacht or we saw . . . you know, 
Elvis Presley working at Burger King or whatever, you know.  I mean you hear all this crap.  
And I mean I know I saw him die and I know he is silenced.  And that is what I wanted.   
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edge.194  Participant 19, a survivor and nonwitness, specifically attributes a sense of relief 
following the execution to media coverage instead of McVeigh’s presence.195 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 This inquiry is but the first step towards researching the perceptions which murder 
victims’ family members form towards legal proceedings, including execution, as well as the 
psychological and mnemetic effects that attendance and participation in legal proceedings has 
upon reconstruction and recovery.  More research is needed to determine more precisely the 
effects of perpetrator media images upon families’ perceptions of those perpetrators, as well as 
on the permutations and limitations of the victim-offender relationship.  Finally, McVeigh is an 
atypical perpetrator, and the Oklahoma City bombing is most definitely an atypical murder case 
in terms of mass victimage and intensity of media coverage, and so additional research is needed 
to address what occurs in less-publicized murders with fewer victims. 
Nonetheless, this research into the collective formation of memory and resolution of the 
cultural trauma of the Oklahoma City bombing through social group membership and legal 
proceedings offers a glimpse into the mechanisms by which “justice” is expanded and status as 
“justice” stakeholders is extended to victims’ families and survivors in addition to legal actors.  
The expansion has two dimensions.  First the status of “victim” no longer is granted only to the 
dead body of the murder victim whose wounds and markings serve as objective “evidence” at the 
murder trial, but now encompasses as well the murder victims’ family members and all the 
subjectivity of their suffering.  The living make more demands than the dead, but speak with the 
weight of the grave in their rhetoric.  Prosecutory proceedings for McVeigh and Nichols were 
rife with instances where victims asserted their right to move out of the legal periphery—the 
right to be allowed to attend the presentation of evidence despite being slated to give victim 
impact testimony, the right to attend the trial after venue was moved from Oklahoma City to 
Denver,  the right to witness the execution despite a witness room with a capacity of 10 
witnesses.  Second, the concept of penal “justice” itself has been enlarged from what is privately 
owed to the perpetrator in recognition of his individual free will and capacity for responsibility to 
include as well that which is publicly owed to the victims’ family in recognition for their loss 
and suffering.  As part of this expansion from privatized punishment to public reckonings, 
demands for justice have increasingly been for witnessed justice.  These developments serve to 
problematize concepts such as accountability and vengeance, rendering them more complex than 
merely prosecuting and obtaining a conviction.   
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 Participant 19 noted,  
 
it’s not so much that he is or isn’t alive, it’s that, his…access to media…. if he wouldn’t have 
been writing people and calling people and giving interviews and making pronouncements 
and so on, you know, it’d be a lot easier to live with him, being in prison for the rest of his 
life….all the media packed up like you know what we are free, they will not ever come back 
in this manner again ever…you will not ever get any more pronouncements from McVeigh on 
anything.   
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 The implications of this case study are sundry.   Just as the social construction of victims 
and justice alters, so must the responsibilities of the State incorporate these constructions into its 
judicial operations.  No longer may the State just arrest and prosecute; now it must recognize the 
victims’ suffering and compensate for their losses as well.  Evolving constructions of victimhood 
demand that law be progressive in its aims, expanding its focus so that “[i]t is no longer about 
individuals and their responsibilities, about crime and punishment,” but increasingly about 
“public responsibility and public solidarity, about risks of life and collective support.”196  In this 
way, law—as a collective institution—“not only defines the imperfection of the social order but 
takes responsibility also for its repair; it not only assesses the harm inflicted to victims but also 
carries the burden of its healing.”197  Law’s foundations, then, are no longer rooted in individual 
responsibility but collective accountability, “engender[ing] a turn from retaliatory justice to 
public responses to suffering.”198  Gradually, then, law is stepping into the shoes of cultural 
redefinition, albeit at times unwillingly.  
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 Appendix:  Participant Characteristics 
 
Participant 
No. 
Sex  Status Interviewed Viewed 
Execution 
Attended Trial Testified at a 
Legal Proc. 
Opinion on DP 
B/F 
Opinion on DP 
After 
Misc. Info 
1 M S 6/24/2005 N Y-all N For For  
2 F S 6/24/2005 N Y-2/3 days Y Against Against  
3 M S 6/24/2005 N N N Against Against   
4  RESCUE       Not Included in 
Analysis 
5 M S 7/2/2005 Y Y N  For For  
6 F  S 7/3/2005 N Y, one day N Against Against  
7 F S 7/5/2005 Y Y Y For  For  
8 F  FM 7/5/2005 N Y N For For   
9 F S 7/5/2005 N Y-1 day N No opinion For  
10 F FM 7/6/2005 N Y, extensively  Y For For  
11 F S 7/9/2005 N Y N Against Against  
12 M  S 7/9/2005 N, but 
would 
have 
liked to 
Y Y Against  For Critically injured 
13  RESCUE       Not Included in 
Analysis 
14 F FM 7/16/2005 N N N For For  
15 F S 7/16/2005 Y Y—40 hours N For For  
16 F S 7/17/2005 N Y N For For  
17 M FM 7/17/2005 N Y Y Against For, then Against  
18 M S 7/24/2005 N N N For For  Does not live in 
Oklahoma 
19 F S 9/29/2005 N Y Y For Come to be more 
against 
 
20 M S 9/29/2005 N N N For For  
21 F S 9/30/2005 Y Y Y No opinion, on 
fence 
No opinion, on 
fence 
 
22 F FM  9/30/2005 Y Y Y For For  
23 M S 10/2/2005 N Y Y Against Against  
24 M S 11/2/2005 N Y only as 
witness 
Y For For  
25 M FM 4/29/2006 Y-Live Y-1 week 
Denver, 40-45% 
N N Case-by-case  
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in OKC 
26 F S 4/29/2006 N Y-2 weeks N For Case-by-case, 
now more 
against 
 
27 F S 4/29/2006 N Y – 3 days N For Against  
28 F FM 4/30/2006 Y-Live Y, 1 week 
Denver, 2-3 
days/week OKC 
Y For For  
29 F FM 5/22/2006 Y-Live Y—1 week for 
each of 3 trials 
Y Case-by-case Case-by-case  
